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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments of 1976' (MDA) to
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). The purpose
of the MDA is to give the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority
over medical devices and to authorize the FDA to promulgate regulations
pertaining to these devices, thereby assuring their safety and effective-
ness.
1. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1994)).
2. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34
Stat. 768.
3. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1094, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1103; see also Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1455
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The MDA contains an express preemption provision with respect to
state law.4 This provision declares that the MDA shall preempt any state
law that is "different from, or in addition to" any provision of the MDA.
5
Courts have interpreted this provision inconsistently.6 The FDA also has
interpreted the MDA's preemption provision, albeit indirectly.7 Some
courts have relied upon FDA interpretations as being strongly suggestive
of Congress' intended meaning with respect to the preemption provision.
Courts have, however, cited the FDA's interpretations for inconsistent
propositions.9 The ambiguity with respect to this preemption issue be-
came more clear on June 26, 1996, when the Supreme Court handed
down the decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.10
This Note has several goals. The first goal is to explain the context in
which the Supreme Court decided Medtronic. The second goal is to ex-
plain the holding in Medtronic. The final goal is to discuss and interpret
the future implications of the Medtronic decision.
To facilitate these goals, Part II of this Note details the background
and threshold issues for analysis of preemption issues. Part III explains
both the substantive and practical aspects of the MDA. Part IV analyzes
federal appellate courts' treatment of the issue of whether the MDA pre-
empts state tort claims. Part V explains the decision in Medtronic. Finally,
Part VI illustrates how courts have interpreted cases involving MDA pre-
emption issues since Medtronic and delineates the future implications of
the decision.
4. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360k(a) (West Supp. 1997).
5. Id.
6. See infra Part IV (discussing various interpretations of MDA preemption of
state-law claims).
7. See infra Part IV.E (discussing the FDA's interpretation of the MDA's pre-
emption provision).
8. See, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir.
1995) (noting "that the FDA interprets the word 'requirement' in § 360k to in-
clude duties imposed by state common law"); see also Mitchell v. Collagen Corp.,
67 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the "FDA regula-
tion ... interprets the statute's preemptive sweep as encompassing state require-
ments established by 'statute, ordinance, regulation, or court decision'"), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp.,
42 F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the FDA has interpreted section
360k(a) as preempting any state requirement, "whether established by statute, or-
dinance, regulation, or court decision"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.
1994) (claiming that "the FDA understands the statute to preempt state tort law");
Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating "[t]he common
law, no less than agency regulations and statutes, can impose 'requirements' on a
manufacturer").
9. See infra Parts IV.A-D.
10. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
1997]
3
Stute: Federal Preemption and the Medical Device Amendments: Medtronic,
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
II. PREEMPTION BACKGROUND
The doctrine of preemption arises out of the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution." The Supremacy Clause states, in perti-
nent part, that "the Laws of the United States which shall be
made ... under the Authority of the United States and of the several
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any... Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."0
2
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this language to
mean that federal law preempts, or takes precedence over, state law that is
inconsistent with federal law.'" The phrase "Laws of the United States" has
been interpreted to mean both statutes and authorized regulations.
4
When courts consider issues arising under the Supremacy Clause regard-
ing areas of law that the states traditionally occupy, courts are to "start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." 5 Based on this language, the Supreme Court has
noted that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" when
undertaking a preemption analysis. 6 When it enacts legislation, Congress
may establish its intent to preempt state law in either an express or an im-
plied manner.
7
11. SeeU.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. Id.
13. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (noting that a state
law in conflict with a federal law is without effect with respect to Article VI, Clause
2); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (quoting the Supremacy Clause
and holding that a state may not add to or take away from the force and effect of a
treaty or statute with respect to foreign affairs); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 427 (1819) (stating that a state law which conflicts with a federal law is "with-
out effect," based on Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution).
14. See City of New York v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 486 U.S. 57,
63 (1988).
15. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947),judgment rev'd
by Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
16. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); see also Malone
v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (relying upon Retail Clerks and
specifically looking to the purpose of Congress).
17. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53
(1982) (noting that congressional preemption may be implied or express);
Malone, 435 U.S. at 505 (stating that congressional intent may be implied or found
expressly in legislative history).
[Vol. 23
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A. Express Preemption
Express preemption presents itself in one of two ways. First, Con-
gress may declare federal legislation to have preemptive effect 8 through
the use of explicit statutory language. 9 Where such express intent is pres-
ent, the court's task in determining whether preemption exists has been
described as an easy one. Second, a federal agency acting within its
authority may expressly declare its intent to preempt the state law in ques-
tion.2 ' The only difference between this situation and one in which Con-
gress expressly preempts state law lies in who promulgated the regulation.
In this type of preemption, a regulatory body, under the authority of Con-
gress, creates the preemption language.
Often, the real question in these situations consists of determining
whether a particular statute warrants the exercise of express or implied
preemption principles. This determination is crucial because it carries
18. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (holding
that state common-law claims are preempted by an express preemption provision
with respect to cigarette advertising).
19. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 360k(a) (West Supp. 1997). Section 360k(a)
states, in pertinent part:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement
- (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement appli-
cable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety
or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a re-
quirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
Id.; see alsoJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (stating that ex-
press preemption is present when Congress has "unmistakably... ordained" that
its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce).
20. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (stating that the
decision is simple when Congress' intent is clearly communicated through explicit
statutory language); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138
(1990) (holding that where a federal statute contains a broad preemption provi-
sion, the Court's job in discerning congressional intent is simplified).
21. See City of New York v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 486 U.S. 57,
64 (1988) ("The statutorily authorized regulations -of an agency will preempt any
state or local law that conflicts with such regulations .... ); Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699-700 (1984) (holding that in proper circumstances,
agency authority is exclusive and state efforts to regulate are preempted); Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 159 (enforcing agency preemption so long as
the agency acted within its statutory authority).
22. Compare Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
104 n.2 (1992) (holding that the text of OSHA, while "provid[ing] the strongest
indication that Congress intended the promulgation of a federal safety and health
standard to preempt all nonapproved state regulation of the same issue," does not
"rise to the level of express preemption"), with id. at 109, 111 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (discussing the "undue expansion of our implied preemption jurispru-
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substantive implications for the scope of preemption.
Courts determine the breadth of an express preemption provision by
reliance upon express preemption principles and the language used by
Congress, rather than by looking to the comprehensive nature of the
statutory scheme in question. 4 Where Congress includes an express pre-
emption provision, it is not necessary to infer congressional intent with
respect to preemption. 5 However, where the statutory language is unclear
as to the intended scope of the preemption provision, courts should ex-
amine legislative history to assist in determining the intended scope of the
provision in question. 6
B. Implied Preemption
Implied preemption exists when Congress (or an agency with juris-
diction) has not made an express declaration with respect to preemption,
but "federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to sup-
plement it.'" 27 Implied preemption is often divided into two general cate-
gories: field preemption and direct conflict preemption.
23. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2.
24. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). The
Morales Court rejected an attempt to distinguish the preemption provision of the
Airline Deregulation Act from ERISA's preemption provision on the ground that
ERISA's preemption provision had a "wide and inclusive sweep" whereas the Air-
line Deregulation Act did not. Id.; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U.S. 658 (1993) (holding that preemption exists only if the federal regulations
substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law).
25. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (quoting
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)) ("[T]here
is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws from the substantive
provisions of the legislation."); see also CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 665 (rejecting a
claim of implied conflict preemption based on express preemption analysis);
Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507
U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (expressing reluctance to infer preemption in the absence of
an express provision requiring preemption); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachu-
setts, 971 F.2d 818, 823 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that when "Congress includes an
express preemption clause in a statute, judges ought to limit themselves to the
preemptive reach of that provision without essaying any further analysis under the
various theories of implied preemption").
26. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
686-87 (1990) (proposing a scheme of textualism in which an analysis of preemp-
tion incorporates the use of legislative history under certain circumstances).
27. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de
la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
28. SeeJoseph T. McLaughlin et al., New Directions in Federal Civil Practice and
Procedure, Q247 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 151, 160 (1996) (noting that "conflict preemption
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1. Field Preemption
Field preemption occurs in three situations. First, field preemption
occurs when a federal regulation in a given area is so pervasive that it pre-
cludes supplementation by the states. 9 Second, field preemption occurs
when the federal interest in the field is "sufficiently dominant. "3 Finally,
field preemption occurs under circumstances in which "the object sought
to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed
by it... reveal the same purpose. " 31
2. Direct Conflict Preemption
Preemption by means of direct conflict arises when "compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."32 Preemp-
tion by direct conflict also occurs when state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."3 3 Finally, even if a federal and state law share a common goal,
preemption may occur if the state law interferes with the methods that the
federal statute is using to implement federal goals. 4 The Supreme Court
has noted that the existence of federal regulation, in and of itself, is not
enough to warrant preemption of all state law in a given area.-"
29. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing
Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)).
30. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65-68
(1940)).
31. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1988) (hold-
ing, that the Natural Gas Act regulated the field to the exclusion of state law); see
also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (reasoning that the crea-
tion of a special federal rule is not justified where there is no significant conflict
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law); Hillsborough
County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (discussing pre-
emption and the Supremacy Clause where state and federal law conflict); Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153 (holding that preemption principles are
not inapplicable simply because real property law is a matter of special concern to
the states).
32. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 222-23 (1983) (holding that a California statute which
regulates the construction of nuclear plants is not preempted by federal law).
33. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
34. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (hold-
ing that the Clean Water Act preempted a Vermont nuisance law, because the
Vermont law "would allow respondents to circumvent the [federally-imposed]
permit system, thereby upsetting the balance of public and private interests so
carefully addressed by the Act").
35. See Automated Med. Lab., 471 U.S. at 719. "Undoubtedly, every subject
that merits congressional legislation is, by definition, a subject of national con-
cern. That cannot mean, however, that every federal statute ousts all related state
law .... Instead, we must look for special features warranting preemption." Id.
1997]
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III. THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS OF 1976
The MDA is regulatory legislation passed to protect the public from
harm caused by the use of medical devices. 6 The MDA was enacted for
two reasons: to encourage the research and development of medical de-
vices, 7 and as a "kneejerk" reaction to the Dalkon Shield tragedies of the
1960s and 1970s.38
Prior to the enactment of the MDA, there were no federally estab-
lished controls governing the marketing and sale of medical devices. 9 As
medical technology advanced in the 1950s and 1960s, the use of complex
medical devices such as brainscans, kidney dialysis machines, and heart
pacemakers and valves became more common in medical treatment.40 In
the 1960s and early 1970s, tragedy struck when a large number of women
suffered injury from the use of a contraceptive device known as the Dal-
kon Shield.41 Congress enacted the MDA largely in response to the
36. See S. REP. No. 94-33, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070.
37. See id. at 2.
38. See id.
39. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1996) (citing Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, §§ 501-502, 52 Stat. 1049-51) (noting that
in 1938 Congress broadened the coverage of the Food and Drug Act of 1906 to
include misbranded or adulterated medical devices and cosmetics in response to
concern about false advertising claims, but that it did not grant the FDA the
power to control the introduction of new medical devices). See generally David F.
Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Sub-
stantive Provisions, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939) (describing the struggle to
enact the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 as a "campaign of attrition");
H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 6 (1976).
40. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246 (citing SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT &
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., IST
SESS., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA's NEGLECTED CHILD 98-F (Comm.
Print 1983)); S. REP. No. 94-33, at 5 (1976).
41. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246. The Court noted that use of the Dalkon
Shield "resulted in a disturbingly high percentage of inadvertent pregnancies, se-
rious infections, and even, in a few cases, death" Id. (citing Regulation of Medical
Devices (Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)); see also Kennedy v. Colla-
gen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1455 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that injuries were suffered
by many women as a result of the use of the Dalkon Shield during the 1960s and
1970s), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996); In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709,
711 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The first action to come to trial against Robins charging in-
juries from the use of the Dalkon Shield arose in the state court in Kansas and re-
sulted in a verdict in February 1975 in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$85,000, including a $75,000 punitive award."). In a commentary on the Dalkon
Shield crisis, the author notes that the legislative history of the MDA reveals con-
cern over injuries caused by the use of IUDs such as the Dalkon Shield. See Mary
G. Boguslaski, Classification and Performance Standards under the 1976 Medical Device
Amendments, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 421, 423 (1985). "During the same time
period, consumer advocates encouraged the public to voice a desire to weigh the
[Vol. 23
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mounting government and consumer concern over such devices.42
The United States Congress enacted the MDA to "provide for the
",43safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use.
Congress noted two purposes underlying the enactment of the MDA.4
The first is to protect the public from harm by placing a regulatory
scheme on medical devices to ensure their safety and effectiveness.4 The
second purpose is to encourage the development of medical devices by
creating a uniform scheme of regulation, thereby ensuring that develop-
ment is economically feasible.4 The MDA functions as a federal scheme
of regulation with respect to medical devices and gives the FDA compre-
hensive control over the use and introduction of such devices.47
risks involved in using a product against perceived benefits themselves, rather
than allowing FDA to determine the risk-benefit ratio, and, therefore, to deter-
mine the availability of products in the United States." Id.
42. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246 (stating that products such as catheters,
artificial heart valves, defibrillators, and pacemakers were attracting the attention
of both consumers and legislators, and that the MDA was enacted as a response to
concern over all of these products); see also Ministry of Health v. Shiley, 858 F.
Supp. 1426, 1434 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that the MDA was enacted largely in
response to the public outcry following the injuries suffered in the 1960s and
early 1970s by women using the Dalkon Shield); Gail H. Javitt, I've Got You Under
My Skin - And I Can't Get Redress: An Analysis of Recent Case Law Addressing Preemp-
tion of Manufacturer Liability for Class III Medical Devices, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 553,
558 (1994) (stating that federal investigations into the Dalkon Shield injuries con-
firmed that the "pace of the [medical device] industry far exceeded the FDA's
ability to control it").
43. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1994)).
44. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), 360c(a)(1)(B), 360e(d)(2),
3 60j(g) (1), 360k(a) (West Supp. 1997); see also Lohr v. Medtronic, 56 F.3d 1335,
1339 (llth Cir. 1995). In Medtronic, the Eleventh Circuit noted two competing
congressional purposes for enacting the MDA. See id. at 1339. The court also
noted, however, that the two purposes should not be interpreted as Congress' ex-
clusive motives in enacting the MDA, as legislative acts often have competing in-
terests. See id. at n.1.
45. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 360c(a) (1) (A) (i), 360c(a) (1) (B), 360e(d)(2); see also
Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1455 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 94-1090, reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1103) (holding that Congress enacted the MDA "to assure the
reasonable safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use").
46. See21 U.S.C.A. §§ 360j(g)(1), 360k(a).
47. See Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1995);
Lewis v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., 56 F.3d 703, 704 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the MDA was enacted to vest regulatory power over medical devices in the
FDA); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that since
the enactment of the MDA, the FDA has had the authority to regulate the medical
device industry and the entrance of such devices into the marketplace), cert.
granted and judgment vacated by 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46
F.3d 1316, 1319 (3rd Cir. 1995) (characterizing the MDA as "a comprehensive ex-
tension of the FDA's authority beyond medical drug manufacturers to medical
device manufacturers"); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1994)
1997]
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The MDA grants a federal agency authority to regulate the medical
device industry." This was the first instance that Congress granted any
federal agency authority to regulate the medical device industry.49 The
MDA establishes a classification scheme for all medical devices.50 Pursuant
to the MDA, the FDA places medical devices into one of three classes
based upon the level of risk associated with the device.5' The following
section explains this classification scheme.
A. Classification of Medical Devices Based on Level of Risk
The MDA gives the FDA the power to classify medical devices in-
tended for human use into one of three categories based on the level of
risk the device poses to the public. These categories are Class I, Class II,
and Class 111.52 According to the MDA, this classification is to be based on
the degree of regulation necessary to assure the safety and effectiveness of
the device.5 The devices with the highest amount of risk associated with
their use are classified as Class III devices, and they are the most heavily
regulated under the MDA.54
1. Class I Devices
Medical devices can receive Class I status in one of two ways. 5  First, if
a manufacturer can provide a reasonable assurance of the safety and effec-
tiveness of the device, the device will receive Class I status. 56 This is ac-
complished by showing that the device is controlled by another MDA sec-
tion and that the controls within this section are sufficient to provide the
(explaining that the amendments gave the FDA comprehensive regulatory
authority over medical devices for the first time); see also Committee of Dental
Amalgam Mfrs. & Distribs. v. Stratton, 92 F.3d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the MDA grants broad authority to the FDA to regulate medical devices), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 754 (1997); Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1455 (stating that the MDA gives
broad powers of classification and regulation to the FDA).
48. See Michael, 46 F.3d at 1319 ("[Congress] granted the FDA new broad
powers to regulate medical devices.").
49. See Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1331 (7th Cir.
1992).
50. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360c(a) (1) (A)-(C) (West Supp. 1997) (detailing the
device classification scheme).
51. See id.; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1996).
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)-(C) (1994) (explaining the different re-
quirements for Class I, II, and III devices).
53. See id.
54. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246 (referring to pacemakers as an example
of a Class III device).
55. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (a) (1) (A). The two means include devices for which
controls are authorized and devices for which insufficient information exists to
determine controls. See id.
56. See id. § 360c(a) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. 1996).
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necessary assurance of safety and effectiveness.17 Second, even if a device
cannot be shown to be safe and effective by the previously described
method, the device may receive Class I status if it is not used in a life-
sustaining capacity or in a capacity in which it is of substantial importance
in preventing the impairment of health. 58 Examples of Class I devices in-
clude tongue depressors and crutches."
Class I designation is the lowest level of regulation applicable to de-
vices falling under the MDA. Such devices are subject only to "general
controls." 60 General controls consist of regulations with respect to mis-•  ' 6 ' 62
branding, registration, adulteration,63 good manufacturing practices,
57. See id. (cross-referencing a list of MDA sections that constitute "general
controls"); see also infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing general
controls).
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (1)(A) (ii); see also Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246
(stating that "devices that present no unreasonable risk of illness or injury are des-
ignated Class I"); Committee of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distribs. v. Stratton, 92
F.3d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that "medical devices which pose little or no
threat to public health are classified as Class I").
59. See General Hospital & Personal Use Devices, 21 C.F.R. § 880.6230
(1996) (listing tongue depressors as a Class I device); Physical Medicine Devices,
21 C.F.R. § 890.3150 (1996) (listing crutches as an example of a Class I device); see
also Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1455 (9th Cir. 1995); Duvall v. Bris-
tol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 395 (4th Cir. 1995); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46
F.3d 1316, 1319 (3rd Cir. 1995); Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948, 950
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (A) (1994); see also Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246;
Duvall, 65 F.3d at 396; Michael, 46 F.3d at 1319.
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1994). A medical device is misbranded if it does not
have a label indicating the following information: (1) name and place of business
of the device manufacturer, (2) name of the packer or distributor of the device,
(3) an accurate statement of the contents of the package, (4) correct name of the
device, (5) directions for use, and (6) appropriate warnings. See id. § 352(b),
(e) (1), (f). This section does, however, allow for reasonable variations from these
requirements and allows the Secretary of the FDA to exempt small packages from
the labeling requirements. See id. Additionally, a device that is labeled in a false
or misleading manner is misbranded. See id. § 352(a).
62. See id. § 360. This section contains requirements regarding registration
of device manufacturers. See id. The section also provides for the creation of a
registration number system to identify manufacturers, allows the FDA to inspect
any establishment registered under this section, and forces any manufacturer who
wishes to introduce its device into the stream of commerce to file a report with
the FDA. See id. § 360(e), (h), (k).
63. See id. § 351. This section defines adulteration of both drugs and medi-
cal devices. See id. Adulterated devices are as those devices which are: (1) not in
conformity with certain described performance standards (specifically Class III
devices), (2) banned under section 360f, and (3) not in conformity with certain
manufacturing, packing, storage or installation requirements. See id. § 352(e),
(g), (h). Any IDE device that is not in compliance with the requirements placed
upon the device is also an adulterated device. See id. § 352 (i); see also infra notes
108-12 and accompanying text (defining and discussing IDE devices).
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notification and repair, replacement or refund, banned devices,6 and rec-
ords and reports.65 These "general controls" apply to all devices regulated
under the MDA. 6
2. Class II Devices
Class II devices are those devices that cannot be classified as Class I
because they do not satisfy one of the two criteria discussed above for ob-
taining Class I status. 67 Further, to receive Class II status, enough informa-
tion must be available with respect to the device so that "special controls"
may be established to ensure its safety and effectiveness.66 Special controls
include promulgation of performance standards, postmarket surveillance,
patient registries, development and dissemination of guidelines, recom-
mendations, or any other actions that are deemed appropriate by the Sec-
retary of the FDA.6 9 Examples of Class II devices include oxygen masks,70
bone conduction hearing aids, and tampons. 72
64. See 21 U.S.C. § 360f. This section gives the Secretary of the FDA the
power to ban a medical device. See id. § 360f(a). The Secretary may ban a device
if it is intended for human use and presents a substantial risk of causing illness or
death. See id. § 360f(a) (1). The Secretary of the FDA has the authority to notify
all health professionals of a device found to be a substantial risk to health. See id.
§ 360h(a). The Secretary also has the power to recall any such device. See id. §
360h(e).
65. See id. § 360i. Under this section, the FDA requires device manufactur-
ers to make reports to the FDA under a variety of circumstances. See id. For ex-
ample, anytime a device manufacturer becomes aware that one of its devices may
have caused or contributed to a serious injury or death, that manufacturer must
make a report to the FDA. See id. § 360i(a) (1) (A). Moreover, section 360j pro-
vides that any requirement imposed under the previously explained sections re-
mains in effect until it is changed. Id. § 360j (a). It exempts custom devices from
sections 360d and 360e. See id. § 360j (b). This section also gives FDA authority to
prescribe regulations that establish "good manufacturing practices" or GMPs. See
id. § 360j (f). Finally, this section creates the exemption for IDE devices from
various MDA sections. See id. § 360j (g).
66. See Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating "all
classes of medical devices are subject to general controls, including labeling re-
quirements and so-called good manufacturing practices"); Bianca I. Truitt, Injured
Consumers and the FDA: Should Federal Preemption Protect Medical Device Manufacturers
Under a Quasi-Governmental Immunity?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 157 (1994) (noting
that the MDA imposes general, minimum controls on all three classes of medical
devices).
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (1) (B) (1994).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1455 (9th Cir. 1995); Mi-
chael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1319 (3rd Cir. 1995).
71. See Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 396 (4th Cir. 1995).
72. See Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1455.
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If a Class II device is intended to support or sustain human life, then
the Secretary must examine and identify the special controls that are nec-
essary to provide adequate assurance of safety and effectiveness. 3 The
Secretary also must describe how the chosen controls provide the neces-
74sary safety assurance.
3. Class III Devices
A device is categorized as a Class III device when it meets the follow-
ing criteria.7 - First, there must be insufficient information with respect to
the safety and effectiveness of the device for it to meet the requirements
78for Class I or II status. Second, the device must be one that is used to
support or sustain human life and that presents a potentially unreasonable
risk of either illness or injury. 77 Third, the device must pass premarket ap-
proval unless an exception applies. 78 Examples of Class III devices include
pacemakers, cardiac catheters, heart valves, inflatable penile implants, and
joint replacements. 9
B. Premarket Approval and Its Limited Application to Class III Devices
According to the MDA, all Class III devices must pass a rigorous ap-
proval process known as premarket approval (PMA). s8 This process re-
quires the manufacturer to submit a detailed application to the FDA. The
application must include the following information: an outline of the de-
vice's components and properties; a description of the manufacturing
73. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (1) (B) (1994).
74. See id.
75. Seeid. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
76. See id. § 360c (a) (1) (C) (i). Insufficient information prohibits the estab-
lishment of a reasonable performance standard. See id. § 360c (a) (1) (C).
77. See id.; Committee of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distribs. v. Stratton, 92
F.3d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that Class III devices are "medical devices
that pose a high risk of injury or that are implanted in the body"); Kennedy, 67
F.3d at 1455 (noting that "Class III devices are those devices which are implanted
in the body or which pose a potentially unreasonable risk of injury"); Michael v.
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1320 (3rd Cir. 1995) (stating that "Class III de-
vices... include all devices which are to be implanted into people, which are
used to sustain life, or which pose a potentially unreasonable risk of injury").
78. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing the premarket approval process and its
exceptions).
79. See Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1455 (stating that pacemakers, heart valves and
replacement joints are all examples of Class III devices); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-
Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 396 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that pacemakers, replace-
ment heart valves, and inflatable penile implants are examples of Class III de-
vices); Michael, 46 F.3d at 1320 (noting that the Shiley heart valve is an example of
a Class III device).
80. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e (1994) (setting out the specific
procedures for obtaining premarket approval).
1997]
13
Stute: Federal Preemption and the Medical Device Amendments: Medtronic,
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1997
ILLIAMMITCHELL LWREVIEW[
process; safety data including human and animal testing results; a bibliog-
raphy of all reports concerning the device's safety and effectiveness; cop-
ies of all proposed labeling; description of the intended use of the prod-
uct; and any other information requested by the FDA. 8'
The FDA spends an average of 1200 hours reviewing each submis-
sion.8 The FDA also may refer the application to a panel of experts which
can include nonvoting representatives of consumers and the medical de-
vice industry. 8n Finally, the FDA must approve the application within 180
days unless one of four circumstances exists: (1) there is a failure to estab-
lish a reasonable assurance that the device is safe or effective under the
recommended conditions of use; (2) the manufacturing methods do not
conform to the requirements for good manufacturing practices; (3) the
proposed labeling is false or misleading; or (4) the device does not con-
form to an applicable performance standard.84
The PMA process is an important one. It is the means by which the
FDA determines whether a Class III device is safe and effective for its in-
tended use.88 The MDA's policy of ensuring the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices was of special concern with respect to Class III devices be-
86cause of the life-supporting nature of such devices. Thus, the MDA re-
quires that Class III devices be approved for marketing through the PMA
87process.
81. See id. § 360e(c)(1)(A)-(G) (1994); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(2)-(12); see
also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1996) (noting what is en-
tailed in the PMA process); Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1455-56; Duvall, 65 F.3d at 396;
Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1995); Michael, 46 F.3d at
1320.
82. See Lawrence S. Makow, Medical Device Review at the Food and Drug Admini-
stration: Lessons from Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy and Bilary Lithotipsy, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 709, 735 n.187 (1994) (citing Medical Devices & DrugIssues: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Health & the Environment, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
100th Cong. 384 (1987) (statement ofJames S. Benson, Deputy Director, DRH));
see alsojonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different
Routes to the Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 510, 512-14 (1984) (stating that
the PMA process is detailed and labor-intensive).
83. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b) (2) (1994).
84. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1997).
85. See Kahan, supra note 82, at 512-14.
86. See Kahan, supra note 82, at 511-12. Congress established the PMA pro-
cess as a heightened degree of scrutiny. See id. This stringent process arises as a
result of the "risk-laden" products that comprise Class III devices. Id.; see also su-
pra note 79 and accompanying text (giving examples of Class III life-supporting or
-sustaining devices).
87. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (alluding to the high risk of
Class III devices and the need for the PMA process).
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C. Exceptions to Premarket Approval
There are three exceptions to the premarket approval process for
Class III devices. These exceptions allow manufacturers to skip the rig-
orous PMA process altogether, thereby enabling manufacturers to sell cer-
tain devices to the public without any determination of their safety or ef-
fectiveness.n These exceptions illustrate the balance the MDA seeks to
strike between the policy of protecting the public and the policy of en-
couraging the development of medical devices.9 The next section will
show that with respect to these exceptions, the balance looms precariously
close to being tipped in favor of the economic interests of medical device
manufacturers.
1. Grandfather Exception
The MDA allows all medical devices in use prior to the enactment of
the MDA in 1976 to continue to be marketed without being subject to the
PMA process. 91 This is known as the grandfather exception. Congress
created this exception to avoid the removal of existing medical devices
from the marketplace.92 Technically, the MDA requires that at some point
in the future, the manufacturers of these grandfathered devices will be
forced to put their products through the PMA process."3 Up to this point,
however, the FDA has not initiated, or even suggested, that any grandfa-
thered devices be subject to the PMA process to establish their safety or
effectiveness.9
88. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (1) (A) (1994) (providing the grandfather loop-
hole); id. § 360e(b) (1) (B) (i) (stating that the device is of a type already intro-
duced or delivered); id. § 360e(b) (1) (B) (ii) (providing the "substantially similar"
loophole); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1996) (asserting that
"not all, or even most, Class III devices on the market today have received pre-
market approval").
89. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360e(b)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1997); 21 C.F.R. §
814.2(a) (1996) (stating that although loopholes exist, the ultimate purpose of
the PMA process is to provide an efficient and thorough review of devices).
90. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (delineating the policies
underlying the MDA).
91. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (1) (A) (1994).
92. See id.; 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1).
93. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247 n.3. The MDA calls for initiation of the
PMA process for several Class III devices, such as implantable pacemaker pulse
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2. Substantial Equivalence
The second exception to premarket approval is known as the "sub-
stantial equivalence" exception. 95 Under this exception, devices that are
shown to be substantially equivalent to devices which are already legally
marketed under the MDA may be marketed without going through the
premarket approval process. 9'
Interestingly, the MDA also allows the marketing and sale of devices
that prove to be substantially equivalent to a grandfathered device without
subjecting them to the premarket approval process or requiring any other
97showing of safety and effectiveness. The MDA included this exception to
the PMA process to prevent manufacturers' grandfathered devices from
obtaining an instant monopoly and to ensure that improvements and
changes to existing devices are easily introduced into the market.9" Medi-
cal device manufacturers have used this exception extensively. 99 In fact,
most Class III devices introduced since 1976 have been approved by the
MDA through determination of "substantial equivalence."'
In order to market a product as "substantially equivalent," a manufac-
turer must undergo a process known as premarket notification, or section
510(k) notification, ninety days before the device is marketed.'O Then the
FDA must clear the device for marketing.0 2 This requires only a showing
that the product is, in fact, substantially similar to a device that is being
marketed legally under the MDA, including a grandfathered device.' 3
Under the "substantial equivalence" exception through the section 510(k)
notification process, no substantive inquiry is made with respect to the
safety or effectiveness of a device before it is allowed to be marketed.
10 4
The implication of the "substantial equivalence" and grandfather ex-
ceptions is that many Class III devices, the most life-sustaining and possibly
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 814(c) (1).
96. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b) (1) (B); 21 C.F.R. § 814(c) (1); see also Medtronic,
116 S. Ct. at 2247 (concluding that approximately 92% of the Class III devices in-
troduced since 1957 were admitted as "substantial equivalents" without any PMA
review).
97. See21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (1) (B); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1).
98. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (1) (B); see also Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247 (not-
ing that the "substantial equivalence" exception to the PMA was allowed to pre-
vent an instant monopoly on pre-1976 devices, and to facilitate improvements to
existing devices for quick introduction into the market).
99. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2247. The allure of this exception is the drop
in reviewing time from 1200 hours for normal PMA approval to 20 hours for the
"substantial equivalent" exception. See id.
100. See id.
101. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.87, .90, .100 (1996).
102. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.100 (detailing the FDA clearance process).
103. See id. § 807.92 (a) (3).
104. See Kahan, supra note 82, at 515.
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life-threatening of all medical devices in use today, have never been tested by
the FDA for safety or effectiveness.' 5 In fact, when notifying a manufac-
turer that its device may be marketed under the "substantial equivalence"
exception, the FDA actually includes a notice informing the manufacturer
that it does not verify that the device is safe or effective and that the
manufacturer may not represent FDA approval of the safety or effective-
ness of the device in question.' 6 The "general controls" applicable to
Class I devices are still applicable, however, to a Class III device that is
marketed as a "substantial equivalent.,
07
This exception stretches to the breaking point the MDA policy of
protecting the public from harm by ensuring the safety and effectiveness
of a medical device. Under this exception, life-supporting devices which
can easily cause serious injury or death upon malfunction may legally be
sold to the public without any testing or other assurances of their safety or
effectiveness.
3. Investigational Device Exemption
The third exception to premarket approval is known as the Investiga-
tional Device Exemption (IDE) .'0 This exception allows a manufacturer
to conduct clinical testing of devices on humans without being subject to
the PMA process.9 These devices, however, remain subject to the PMA
process before they can be marketed to the public. The IDE provides this
limited exception to premarket approval so that manufacturers have the
opportunity to prove the safety and effectiveness of their devices.10 An
example of a device that has been tested on humans prior to premarket
105. See id. at 521-22.
106. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2248 (1996) ("The [FDA]
emphasized, however, that this determination should not be construed as an en-
dorsement of the pacemaker lead's safety."); see alsoJacobs v. E.I. du Pont de Ne-
mours & Co., 67 F.3d 1219, 1225 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting the letter approving
marketing of a medical device, including language to that effect that the letter
does not constitute approval by the FDA of the device or its labeling); Lamon-
tagne v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 41 F.3d 846, 852 (2nd Cir. 1994) (quot-
ing the letter approving marketing an implant as substantially equivalent).
107. See Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting
that "[a]ll classes of devices are subject to 'general controls,' including labeling
requirements and good manufacturing practices").
108. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 360j(g) (West Supp. 1997); 21 C.F.R. § 812 (1996); see
also Roger W. Bivans, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of State Common
Law Claims involving Medical Devices, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (1996) (discussing
the IDE exception to the PMA process).
109. See21 U.S.C. § 36 0j(g); 21 C.F.R. § 812.1.
110. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 3 60 g(l); see also 21 C.F.R. § 813.3 (1996) (defining an
investigational device as one used in a study that involves humans and where the
purpose of the study is to determine whether the device is safe and effective).
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approval under this exception is an intraocular lens."' This device con-
sists of a plastic lens that is implanted into the eye to correct damage done
during cataract removal surgery.1
1 2
The exceptions to the PMA process allow devices to be marketed to
the public without any FDA determination of the safety or effectiveness of
the devices. This situation is especially problematic when a device is mar-
keted as "substantially equivalent" to a grandfathered device. Under these
circumstances, neither the grandfathered device nor the device marketed
under the "substantially equivalent" exception has ever been FDA-tested
for safety and effectiveness. Thus, manufacturers in the United States sell
life-sustaining and possibly life-threatening medical devices that have
never been proven safe or effective.
The next section of this Note presents an additional layer of com-
plexity to this problem. In addition to marketing medical devices that
have never been proven safe or effective, manufacturers also have argued
successfully that the MDA preempted state tort claims with respect to
those devices. Thus, medical device manufacturers were able to market
devices that had never been proven safe or effective while using preemp-
tion to avoid tort liability.
D. The Preemption Provision
The MDA specifically addresses preemption of state and local regula-
tions with respect to medical devices."' 3 Section 360k states, in pertinent
part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or politi-
cal subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with re-
spect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which
is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effec-
tiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a require-
ment applicable to the device under this chapter.
1 4
This section of the MDA also allows for an exemption from preemp-
tion." 5 It provides, in part:
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the Sec-
retary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity
for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under
such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a require-
111. See Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1331-32 (7th Cir.
1992) (noting that an intraocular lens that was implanted in the plaintiff's eye was
part of a clinical trial under the investigational device exemption).
112. See id.
113. See21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994).
114. Id. § 360k(a)(1)-(2).
115. See id. § 360k(b).
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ment of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device in-
tended for human use if (1) the requirement is more stringent than a
requirement under this chapter which would be applicable to the de-
vice if an exemption were not in effect under this subsection; or (2)
the requirement (A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be116
in violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter.
This section provides that an exemption from preemption is available un-
der certain conditions. First, exemption is available when the require-
ment in question is more stringent than an already existing requirement
under the MDA.117 Second, exemption is available when the requirement
is necessitated by compelling local conditions. Finally, an exemption is
also available when compliance with the requirement would not cause the
device to violate the MDA.118
The MDA's preemption provision is an example of an express pre-
emption provision, whereby Congress plainly stated its intent to preempt
state law through statutory language.119 Courts have inconsistently inter-
preted the requirement that no state law be enacted that is "different
from, or in addition to" any of the provisions of the MDA. As the follow-
ing Part shows, courts generally agree that the MDA expresses Congress'
intent to preempt state law. However, courts have disagreed as to the ex-
tent to which the MDA preempts state law.12' The following Part discusses
the federal courts of appeals decisions that have addressed this issue.
IV. MDA PREEMPTION OF STATE-LAW CLAIMS
Typically, the preemption issue arises when a plaintiff brings state
tort claims against a medical device manufacturer, and the manufacturer




119. See supra Part II.A (discussing express preemption).
120. See infra Part IV (discussing inconsistent judicial interpretations).
121. See infra Part IV (discussing federal appellate preemption cases).
122. For the sake of brevity, this Note discusses only federal courts of ap-
peals decisions dealing with MDA preemption of state law.
123. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (7th Cir.
1995), cert. denied and judgment vacated by 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Michael v. Shiley,
Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1324-30 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Becker v.
Optical Radiation Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 19-20 (2nd Cir. 1995); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-
Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 395-97 (4th Cir. 1995); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d
431, 432 (5th Cir. 1995); Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1995);
Anguiano v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1995);
Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th Cir. 1994); Gile v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542 (3rd Cir. 1994); Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d
194, 195 (l1th Cir. 1994); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 17-19 (1st Cir.
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have been divided on the issue of whether the preemptive provision of the
MDA precludes state tort actions for damages against manufacturers of
devices sold under the MDA.124 This Part discusses these decisions accord-
ing to the manner in which the FDA approved the device. Most cases in
which devices were marketed through the full PMA process have held that
the MDA preempts state tort actions.12 Similarly, courts have found state
tort law to be preempted in cases in which the particular devices were
marketed under the IDE exception to the PMA process.126 However,
courts were much less likely to find the state tort claims preempted in
cases where the "substantial equivalence" exception to the PMA process
was used. 27 The reasons for this distinction are apparent when one con-
siders the Medtronic decision.
2
1
When deciding whether the MDA preempts state tort claims, courts
initially must consider whether state tort law imposes "requirements" for
purposes of MDA preemption. 2 9 Courts must then determine whether
the MDA imposes any applicable requirements upon the device in ques-
tion. Third, a determination must be made as to whether the specific
state tort theories asserted are "different from or in addition to" the re-
quirements imposed under the MDA.'30 The following section will show
that courts generally have agreed on the first issue by holding that state
tort law can impose "requirements" for purposes of MDA preemption.
The remaining sections in this Part will address the second and third
questions and will show that courts generally have answered both ques-
tions in the affirmative with respect to devices shown to be safe and effec-
tive under the MDA. However, the answers change when courts have con-
sidered devices that are marketed under section 510(k).
1994); King v. Collagen Corp. 983 F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1st Cir. 1993); Stamps v.
Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1419-21 (5th Cir. 1993); Slater v. Optical Radia-
tion Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1330 (7th Cir. 1992).
124. See infra Part IV.A-D.
125. See infra Part IV.B (discussing five cases in which the MDA preempted
most state tort claims).
126. See infra Part IV.C (discussing three cases in which the plaintiffs' state
tort claims were preempted by the MDA).
127. See infra Part IV.D (discussing six cases in which plaintiffs' state tort
claims received mixed treatment by the courts).
128. See infra Part V.C (discussing the Medtronic Court's resolution of the ex-
tent to which the MDA preempts state tort claims).
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A. State Tort Theories Impose Requirements
Courts generally have agreed that state tort theories can impose re-
quirements under section 360k(a) .13' There are two common bases for
this determination. One basis is the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the term "requirement" in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.32 In Cipollone, the
Court held that the term "requirement," as contained in the preemption
clause of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, was not limited
in application to positive enactments by legislatures and agencies" The
Cipollone court held that state tort theories constitute requirements.' A
second basis courts have used is the FDA's interpretation of section
360k(a).135 According to the FDA, state tort law can impose requirements
136for purposes of MDA preemption under section 360k(a).
Although courts which have considered the issue found that state
tort claims are requirements, these courts stopped short of holding that
section 360k(a) of the MDA preempts all state tort suits.137 Courts have
reasoned that section 360k(a) preempts only those requirements that are
"different from, or in addition to" requirements imposed under the
MDA
38
To find preemption under section 360k(a), courts must make two
additional findings.139 First, the court must determine that a requirement
exists with respect to the device in question. If no requirement exists, no
preemption issue arises. 40 Second, the court must determine that the
131. See supra note 123 (listing cases in which the courts were in agreement
on the issue).
132. 505 U.S. 504, 523-25 (1992).
133. See id.
134. See id.; see also Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1322 (3rd Cir.) (cit-
ing Cipollone as supporting the proposition that the term "requirement" includes
state tort law), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d
1416, 1420 (5th Cir. 1993).
135. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (7th Cir.
1995); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 1995).
136. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1996); see also infra Part IV.E (discussing the
FDA's interpretation).
137. See supra note 123.
138. See, e.g., King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134 (1st Cir. 1993).
139. See id.
140. See id. In King, the court held that preemption under section 360k(a)
does not apply when the FDA has not issued regulations or other requirements
specific to the particular device. See id. An FDA interpretation of section 360k(a)
also supports this assertion. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1996). This interpretation
states:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and
Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or
there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device
under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local re-
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state tort law actually imposes a requirement that is different from, or ad-
ditional to, the requirement imposed by the MDA.14 If there is no re-
quirement different from, or in addition to, one promulgated by the FDA,
preemption under the MDA is not invoked.
42
Thus, courts generally have agreed that state tort actions could im-
pose requirements under the MDA.43  Courts did not agree, however,
whether Class III devices marketed through section 510(k) premarket no-
tification had any requirements applicable to them and, if so, whether
state tort theories imposed requirements different from MDA require-
ments.'4 With respect to these questions, courts have arrived at different
conclusions and based their decisions upon different rationales.4 5 As the
next two sections show, a common thread between these decisions is
whether the device in question has been approved for marketing through
the full PMA process or through section 510(k) notification.
B. Cases in Which a Device Was Marketed After PMA Approval
In a number of cases, courts considered the MDA preemption issue
with respect to devices that had been marketed after passing through the
full PMA process. For each case that discussed below, the court's decision
with respect to two questions will be explained: (1) Are there any re-
quirements applicable to the device in question under the MDA?; and (2)
If so, are the state tort claims in the case at hand different from or in addi-
tion to the requirements imposed under the MDA?'4 The cases in which
the courts answered both questions in the affirmative will be presented
first, followed by the cases in which the courts answered one of the ques-
tions in the negative. As the analysis will show, in most cases in which a
device was marketed after a full PMA approval process, courts have an-
swered both questions in the affirmative.
quirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the
specific Food and Drug Administration requirements.
Id.
141. See King, 983 F.2d at 1134.
142. The specific language of the statute requires this conclusion. See 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
143. See supra note 123.
144. See infra Part IV.B.
145. Compare Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1328-29 (3rd Cir. 1995)
(deciding that to preempt state fraud claims would require a court to scrutinize
the FDA), with Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1995) (declining
to declare MDA preemption when a manufacturer fraudulently obtained approval
from the FDA because the legislative history did not contain language which sup-
ported this exemption).
146. See supra Part IV.A. Because most courts agree that state tort theories
can impose requirements, the first of the three questions described in Part IV.A
will not be addressed in each of the following case summaries.
[Vol. 23
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In Stamps v. Collagen Corp., the plaintiff was injured after receiving in-
jections of an antiwrinkle product.47 The product had been approved for
marketing by the FDA through the PMA process as a Class 
III device. 148
The PMA process itself was held to be the requirement applicable to the
product under the MDA.' 49 The court then held that state tort law related
to the safety or effectiveness of the product.5 Based on this analysis, and
without discussing the individual claims at length, the court concluded
that the state tort claims were preempted by section 360k(a).'"
In Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., a woman was killed when a heart catheter
failed to deflate while inserted in one of her coronary arteries."-2 The
heart catheter was a Class III device approved for marketing through the
PMA process." The plaintiffs claimed an exception to MDA preemption
should apply because the manufacturer had fraudulently obtained ap-
proval for the device from the FDA. 54 The court, however, declined the• 155
invitation to create such an exception.
In Michael v. Shiley, Inc., the plaintiff claimed injuries arising out of
the removal of a defective heart valve." 6 The valve had been approved for
marketing by the FDA through the PMA process as a Class 
III device. 157
147. 984 F.2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir. 1993).
148. See id. at 1421.
149. See id. at 1422.
150. See id. at 1421-23. The theories of inadequate labeling and failure to
warn were easily found to be preempted. See id. at 1422. Interestingly, Stamps
posed the theory that the MDA preempts state law only to the extent that the state
requires a process similar to PMA. See id. at 1423. The court found this to be a
close question and noted that a device that had been marketed as a "substantial
equivalent" did not trigger preemption. Id. (citing Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., 837
P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw. 1992)). The court distinguished Stamps from Larsen as fol-
lows:
Larsen is distinguishable from the instant case in that it involved a device
that passed through a less stringent Class III review process by virtue of
its being 'substantially equivalent' to devices already allowed to be on the
market.... The instant devices are not 'substantially equivalent' to mar-
ketable devices; rather, they have been subjected to the full rigor of the
PMA process.
Id. at n.6.
151. Id. at 1423.
152. 63 F.3d 25, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1995).
153. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Mass. 1994), affd,
63 F.3d 25 (lst Cir. 1995).
154. Talbott, 63 F.3d at 28.
155. See id. The court based its decision on a lack of language supporting
such an exception in either the statute itself or its legislative history. Id. at 27-30.
156. 46 F.3d 1316, 1321-31 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995).
157. Id. at 1320-21. Interestingly, the product in question in Michael, the
Shiley valve, was approved early in the development of the PMA process. It was
approved for marketing without a recorded vote and despite some deficiencies
that would not currently be acceptable. See id. at 1320. The Shiley valve was ap-
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The court found that there were some irregularities in the approval of this
specific device and that no device-specific regulations existed with respect
to the valve. However, the court found that the valve was still subject to
requirements under the MDA, thereby invoking preemption.9 The court
then examined the plaintiff's individual claims to determine whether they
were preempted.'w The court held that the breach of implied warranties
16 1 161claim16' and the fraud on the FDA claim were preempted, but the ex-
press warranty claim based on the valve's label 63 and the fraud based on
the manufacturer's advertisements were not preempted.
T6
In Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., an individual was injured after receiving
injections of an antiwrinkle product. 5 The product was marketed after
FDA approval as a Class III device following the PMA process. The court
held that the PMA process itself constituted a "specific requirement" with
respect to the product in question, thereby invoking preemption.' 67 The
court went on to analyze the individual claims to determine whether any
of them were different from, or additional to, any of the PMA require-
ments. 68 Based on its analysis, the court found the claims of strict liability,
negligence, fraud,"O and breach of implied warranty to be preempted.
17
parently one of the first mechanical devices approved under the MDA. See id. at
1323.
158. Id. at 1324-25.
159. Id. The court listed the following as requirements under the MDA that
applied to the valve: the PMA process, labeling requirements, "good manufactur-
ing practices" (GMP) that are required of all medical device manufacturers, and
the FDA's power to force notification of a previously unknown risk. Id. at 1324.
160. Id. at 1324-36.
161. Id. at 1324-25. The court concluded that the terms of an implied war-
ranty would be determined by looking at the state law in Pennsylvania, which
could significantly differ from MDA requirements. See id. at 1325.
162. Michael, 46 F.3d at 1328-29. The court observed that to allow such a
claim would require the courts to scrutinize intensively the workings of the FDA.
Id. at 1329. The court stated that if the FDA was misled, "it is for the FDA to rem-
edy that situation using the authority Congress gave it in the MDA." Id.
163. Id. at 1325-28. The court held that, because the obligations arose di-
rectly from language approved by the FDA, the liability that results is not different
from, or additional to, the FDA regulation. Id. at 1328.
164. Id. at 1329-31. The court held that because Congress did not express a
wish to insulate medical device manufacturers from liability arising from fraud,
the theory is not preempted by the MDA. Id. at 1331.
165. 67 F.3d 1268, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1279. The court noted that the FDA had not promulgated any
regulations that exclusively applied to the device in question. However, the court
determined that the term "specific requirements" means specificity with respect to
the nature of the requirements, not in their applicability to an individual device.
Id. at 1279 (quoting Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1345-46 (lth Cir.
1995)).
168. Id. at 1280-86.
169. Id. at 1280. The court found these claims to be preempted because
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However, the claim of breach of an express warranty was deemed to have
survived preemption.
2
In King v. Collagen Corp., the plaintiff brought suit after being in-
jected with processed cow tissue, otherwise known as collagen, regulated
as a medical device under the MDA. 17 ' The tissue was a Class III device
approved for marketing through the PMA process. The court ap-
proached the preemption issue by looking at each claim individually and
analyzing whether each presented a regulation different from, or addi-
tional to, any in place under the MDA.'75 An analysis of each of the follow-
ing claims was conducted: strict liability, breach of warranty, negligence,
product misbranding, misrepresentation and failure to warn, and fraud.
176
All of the plaintiffs claims were found to be preempted because they
could constitute regulations different from or additional to those found in
the MDA.
7
In Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., the plaintiff was injected with a collagen
implant and subsequently developed systemic lupus erythematosus.17" In
making its decision, the court rejected the analysis used in ,preceding
cases. 79 Rather, the court reviewed certain FDA interpretations of the ap-
they certainly would add requirements that would be different from or additional
to the requirements set forth in the MDA. Id. at 1280-81. In addition, the court
indicated in dicta that the mislabeling, misbranding, and adulteration claims were
not preempted, and it upheld the lower court's granting of summary judgment
against Collagen Corporation on these claims. Id. at 1281-82.
170. Id. at 1283. The court based its judgment on the notion that to allow
such a claim to proceed would require courts to make detailed inquiries into the
PMA process, essentially performing the same function with which the FDA is en-
trusted. Id. at 1283 (citing Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1329 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995)).
171. Mitchell, 67 F.3d at 1284. The court found this claim preempted to the
extent that it alleged a breach of an implied warranty with respect to the design,
manufacturing, or labeling of the product, because the product was subject to
such requirements under the MDA. Id. at 1284 (citing Michael, 46 F.3d at 1325).
172. Mitchell, 67 F.3d at 1285. The court relied on other cases which held
that express warranty claims were not preempted by the MDA. See id. (discussing
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222, 228-29 (1995); Michael, 46
F.2d at 1325).
173. 983 F.2d 1130, 1131 (lst Cir. 1993).
174. Id. at 1131-32. The court discussed the submissions required in the
PMA process and listed the information submitted to the FDA in this case. See id.
This included proposed labeling, extensive safety testing data, descriptions of
manufacturing methods and materials, and certain revisions after the initial sub-
missions. Id. at 1131.
175. Id. at 1135-36.
176. Id.
177. Id. The court held that each of the claims at issue would constitute a
regulation different from or additional to regulations found in the MDA that ap-
plied specifically to the device in question. See id.
178. 67 F.3d 1453, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995).
179. See id. at 1458. The court claimed that courts previously addressing this
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plicable sections.'8 The court concluded that the PMA process does not
qualify as a "specific requirement applicable to a particular device" 8" and
that Congress did not intend to foreclose relief for those injured by a de-
vice regulated by the MDA and approved through the PMA process.11
In most cases discussed above, the courts held that the MDA pre-
empted the state tort claims. With the exception of claims for express
warranty, fraud on the basis of advertising, and the entire Kennedy deci-
sion, courts have found that regulations existing under the MDA with re-
spect to Class III devices introduced after a PMA process preempted state
tort claims. As discussed in the following section, similar results have been
reached with respect to devices approved for use under the IDE excep-
tion.
C. Cases in Which a Device Was Marketed Under the Investigational
Device Exemption
This section discusses cases in which courts have considered whether
the MDA preempts state tort suits with respect to a device marketed under
the IDE exception to the PMA process. As the analysis shows, courts con-
sistently found that state tort claims were preempted when the device in
question was being marketed pursuant to the IDE exception to the PMA
process.
In Becker v. Optical Radiation Corp., the plaintiff was injured when a
defective experimental lens was implanted in her eye. 8' The product was
being used without undergoing the PMA process pursuant to the IDE ex-
issue had failed to address the following issues adequately: the meaning of the
term "general applicability" as it is used in the MDA; the question of whether
Class III devices as a group may be a "particular device" as that term is used by the
FDA; and the meaning of certain regulations promulgated by the FDA. Id. at
1458-59.
180. Id. at 1459. The court determined that 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1) stood
for the proposition that the MDA does not preempt laws of general applicability.
Id. The court then found that state tort law is law of general applicability because
it merely imposes an indirect effect on manufacturers and, therefore, such laws
are not preempted under the MDA. Id.
181. Id. The fact that the PMA process involves some specific requirements
was distinguished from the notion the PMA process is itself acting as a specific re-
quirement. Id.
182. Id. This line of reasoning - claiming Congress would have been re-
quired to use more specific language to end the possibility of a consumer having
any remedy against a medical device manufacturer - appears again in the Med-
tronic court of appeals' decision. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1345-
46 (l1th Cir. 1995). The Kennedy court also noted that the approval of medical
devices was not intended to free manufacturers from ordinary market burdens
such as state tort suits. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459. The court noted, "Premarket
approval is supposed to benefit consumers, not create a rose garden, free from
liability, for manufacturers." Id. at 1460.
183. 66 F.3d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1995).
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ception. The court found that the IDE exemption to the general re-
quirements applies only when the manufacturer has obtained the in-
formed consent of the patient.184 The court then analyzed the preemption
question under the assumption that the IDE exemption did not apply to
the lens in question and, in the alternative, under the assumption that it
did apply to the lens."5 The court found that if the lens were not exempt
from normal MDA requirements through the IDE exemption, the lens
would have to undergo the PMA process, which constitutes a device-
specific requirement.1 86 The court then held that the tort claims of defec-
tive design, defective manufacture, failure to warn, and failure to test
impermissibly would add requirements different from those imposed by
the MDA.'8 7 Next, the court considered whether the claims being asserted
would be barred by MDA preemption if the lens were exempt from the
normal MDA requirements by means of the IDE exemption.n The court
held that the state tort claims being asserted in this case would impose re-
quirements different from "the MDA scheme" and therefore were pre-
empted."'9
In Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., the plaintiff was injured
when she received a defective pacemaker that had been approved for use
under the IDE exception to the PMA process.' 9° The court found that the
IDE exception imposed several device-specific requirements with respect
to the pacemaker.'8 ' The court held that all of the plaintiffs state tort
184. Id. at 20. The court cited 21 C.F.R. § 813.5, which the court says "ar-
guably" states that a shipment of the lenses in question is not exempt unless the
informed consent of the patient has been obtained. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. The court cited several cases in support of the proposition that tort
claims impose requirements different from those imposed by the MDA. Id. (cit-
ing Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 44 F.3d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct 2251
(1995); Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 44 F.3d 1167, 1168-69 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1420-25
(5th Cir. 1993); and King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (1st Cir.
1993)).
188. Becker, 66 F.3d at 21.
189. Id. The court noted that there were detailed procedures in place for
determining whether the lenses in question were safe and effective under the
MDA. The court cited several cases in support of the proposition that state tort
theories would impose impermissible additional requirements on intraocular
lenses. See id. (citing Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542-44 (3rd Cir.
1994); Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194, 195 (11th Cir. 1994); Slater v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333-34 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327
(1992)).
190. 70 F.3d 39, 41 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied and judgment vacated by 116 S.
Ct. 2576 (1996). The Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration
in light of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
191. Martin, 70 F.3d at 42. The court cited the following provisions as ex-
amples of device-specific regulations imposed through use of the IDE exemption:
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claims were preempted by section 360k(a) of the MDA in that they would
impose requirements different from those imposed under the MDA's de-
vice-specific regulations.
9 2
In Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., the plaintiff was blinded in one eye
when she had an experimental replacement lens removed.9 The lens
had been approved for use under the IDE exception to the PMA proc-194
ess. The court first determined that state tort claims can constitute re-
quirements for purposes of MDA preemption. The court went on to
address whether any of the specific tort claims asserted in the case at hand
were preempted.1 96 The court found that the IDE exemption does impose
device-specific regulations and that the tort theories being asserted in this
case would impermissibly impose requirements different from those im-
posed by the MDA. 197 The court found all of the plaintiffs state tort
claims preempted by section 360k(a) of the MDA 9 '
In each of the above cases involving an IDE device, the courts strictly
applied section 360k(a) preemption. This was due, in large part, to the
public policy favoring experimentation and the development of new de-
vices. The next section will show that section 360k(a) has not been ap-
plied as strictly with respect to devices approved for marketing under sec-
tion 510(k) notification.
21 C.F.R. § 812.5, which mandates investigational device labeling; 21 C.F.R. §
812.7, which prevents the promotion of IDE devices and prohibits representations
that the device is safe or effective for the purposes for which it is being tested; and
21 C.F.R. § 812.25(f), which requires that all labeling with respect to IDE devices
be submitted to the FDA for approval. Id.
192. Id. at 41. The plaintiffs also made a novel Seventh Amendment argu-
ment that the government cannot preempt a state tort action if it provides no
other analogous tort remedy. Id. at 42. The court, however, did not find this ar-
gument persuasive. Id.
193. 22 F.3d 540, 541 (3rd Cir. 1994).
194. Id. at 542.
195. Id. at 543. The court based this determination on Cipollone, in which
the Supreme Court held that state tort theories can be requirements for purposes
of an express preemption provision where the provision itself does not specifically
mention state tort law. Id.
196. Id. Claims of lack of informed consent and adulterated products were
asserted in this case. Id.
197. See id. at 544-45. The plaintiff raised an interesting argument to the
effect that public policy favors allowing remedies to the injured victims of experi-
mental treatment. Id. at 545. The court found that there is a countervailing pub-
lic policy favoring encouragement of discovery and development of new products.
Id. at 546.
198. Id. at 545.
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D. Cases in Which a Device Was Marketed Under Section 510(k)
Notification
The reasoning that consistently has been applied to cases involving
the preemption of state tort claims under the MDA has not been applied
consistently to cases involving devices approved for marketing under sec-
tion 510(k) notification. In this section, six cases are discussed. Four of
the cases employ the reasoning found in the decisions finding state tort
claims preempted by the MDA. However, two of the decisions depart
from the rationale of decisions involving devices approved for marketing
under theories other than section 510(k) notification. The reasoning in
these decisions laid the foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in
Medtronic. The decisions finding preemption are discussed first, followed
by an explanation of the two decisions in which courts refused to find
state tort claims preempted with respect to section 510(k) devices.
1. Cases Finding State Tort Theories Preempted
In English v. Mentor Corp., the plaintiff was injured when his inflatable
penile implant malfunctioned."" The implant had been approved for
marketing by the FDA through the section 510(k) notification exception
to the PMA process, also known as the substantial equivalence excep-
tion.00 The court held that the section 510(k) process and the "general
controls" that apply to section 510(k) products create requirements suffi-
cient to create preemption."' The court concluded that all of the plain-
tiffs state tort claims were preempted by section 360k(a).202
199. 67 F.3d 477, 478 (3rd Cir. 1995).
200. Id. at 480. The court noted that the FDA views the section 510(k) noti-
fication procedure as an intermediate step to obtaining full premarket approval
and that the FDA eventually will require the product to endure a full PMA proc-
ess. Id.
201. Id. at 481-82. The plaintiffs specifically had argued that MDA preemp-
tion did not apply when the product in question was approved under section
510(k). Id. at 482-83. The court found the following to be examples of require-
ments specifically applicable to the device under section 510(k): the notification
must include proposed labels, labeling, and advertisements sufficient to describe
the device; its intended use; photos or engineering drawings of the device; a
statement that the device is similar to and/or different from other products; any
other information requested by the FDA; and "general controls" which include
labeling requirements and good manufacturing practices. Id. at 481.
202. Id. at 483. The court reversed summary judgment on the breach of
express warranty claim and remanded for consideration of that claim. Id. at 484.
The plaintiff had also brought claims of strict product liability, negligence, and
breach of implied warranty. Id. at 483.
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In Mendes v. Medtronic, the plaintiff brought suit after his pacemaker
failed. The pacemaker was approved for marketing as a substantial
equivalent under the section 510(k) exception to the PMA process.20 4 The
court found that the general controls imposed on the device with respect
to labeling and good manufacturing practices constituted requirements
for purposes of section 360k(a) .205 The court considered the causes of ac-
tion individually and found each of the following tort theories preempted:
negligent failure to warn, implied warranty, and negligent manufacture. 20 6
The plaintiff in Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., brought suit after she was in-
jured by an allegedly defective pacemaker which was approved for market-
ing and use by the FDA under the 510(k) premarket notification proce-
dure. °7 The court found that all of the state tort claims were preempted
by section 360k.20 8 In addition, the court remanded the case for the dis-
trict court to determine whether the claim was based on voluntary prom-
ises made by Medtronic, in which case it would not be preempted . 2 0
In Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., an individual was injured by the
failure of a penile implant that had been approved for marketing and use
by the FDA through section 510(k). 2'0 The plaintiff argued that section
360k did not preempt his state-law claims since there were no require-
ments applicable to the defendant's device from which the state require-
ments could differ.21 The court rejected this argument, finding that a va-
riety of requirements were imposed by the section 510(k) process.12 The
203. 18 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994).
204. See id. The court noted that the device had been sold since 1981 with-
out premarket approval. Id.
205. Id. at 18-19. The court held that labeling rules found in 21 C.F.R. §§
801.1, 801.15, and 801.109 and the good manufacturing practices found in 21
C.F.R. §§ 801.1 to 820.198 constitute requirements for purposes of 360k(a) pre-
emption. Id.
206. Id. at 18-20.
207. 82 F.3d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. granted and judgment vacated by
117 S. Ct. 939 (1997).
208. Id. The court found the following claims to be preempted: negligent
design and manufacture, breach of implied warranty for fitness for a particular
purpose, strict liability for defective manufacture, and intentional misrepresenta-
tion. Id. The court also held that the 510(k) process, in and of itself, constitutes a
"requirement" for purposes of section 360k(a). Id. at 82.
209. Id. The court held that if the express warranty claim were found on
remand to be based on FDA-mandated rules with respect to advertising, labeling,
and packaging, then it would be preempted by section 360k(a). Id. at 83.
210. 65 F.3d 392, 395-96 (4th Cir. 1995). In this case, the FDA required the
manufacturer to provide additional information with respect to "sterilization
techniques, testing protocols, design of specific components of the device, pack-
age inserts, indicated uses and fluid requirements." Id.
211. Id. at 396.
212. Id. at 399. The court found the following to constitute requirements
under section 360k(a): good manufacturing practices, the 510(k) notification
process itself, and labeling requirements. Id.
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court then held that all state tort claims were preempted, with the possible
exception of the express warranty claim." s
2. Cases Finding State Tort Theories Not Preempted
In Jacobs v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the plaintiff brought suit af-
ter being injured by an allegedly defective temporomandibular joint in-
terpositional implant.214 This device was distributed after a section 510(k)
premarket notification procedure.2 15 The court declined to determine the
entire scope of preemption under the MDA, focusing instead on the
216plaintiff's individual claims. The court noted that there were no specific
counterpart regulations or any specific requirements with respect to the
device in question, because the defendant had been a supplier of raw ma-
terials, an entity not regulated by the MDA. 21 '7 Further, the court found
that there were no specific requirements or any specific counterpart regu-
lations applicable to the device.2 8 Based on these determinations, the
court found that the plaintiffs state tort claims were not preempted.2 1 9
In Feldt v. Mentor Corp., the plaintiff alleged injury after the failure of
an implanted pump-activated inflatable penile prosthesis. 20 The device
was marketed as a substantial equivalent under section 510(k).2 2 1 The
court held that there were specific requirements applicable to the device
222in question, including regulations with respect to labeling and warn-
ings. 3 Based on its analysis, the court went on to discuss whether any
213. Id. at 401. The basis for this decision was the notion that an express
warranty claim is based upon voluntary promises that are made by the warrantor
instead of upon duties imposed under state law and, therefore, promises are not
preempted by section 360k(a). Id.
214. 67 F.3d 1219, 1222 (6th Cir. 1995). The offending implant was coated
with the defendant's Teflon product as substitute cartilage. The temporoman-
dibularjoint is more commonly known as the jawjoint. Id.
215. Id. at 1225 n.13. The letter authorizing the marketing of the device as
a substantial equivalent through section 510(k) is reprinted in the opinion. Id.
The end of the letter states, "This letter should not be construed as approval of
your device or its labeling." Id.
216. Id. at 1234.
217. Id. at 1236.
218. Id. (discussing Anguiano v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d
806 (9th Cir. 1995); Lamontagne v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 834 F. Supp.
576 (D. Conn. 1993), affjd, 41 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1994)).
219. Id.
220. 61 F.3d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 1995).
221. Id. at 434.
222. Id. at 435-36. "Preemption does not depend on the route the product
takes to the market, but on whether there are any specific federal requirements
applicable to the device." Id. (citing Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 305
(5th Cir. 1995)).
223. Id. at 436. The plaintiff apparently conceded that federal regulations
preempted his failure-to-warn claim. See id.
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other specific requirements affected the device.22 The court held that the
plaintiffs breach of warranty with respect to design and defective design
claims were not preempted because no FDA regulations applied with respect
to design. 5
Four of the cases discussed in the preceding section concluded that
section 360k of the MDA preempted state tort claims against manufactur-
ers of devices approved through the section 510(k) notification process.
However, the Jacobs and Feldt courts held that the PMA process, in and of
itself, does not create "requirements" sufficient to invoke section 360k
preemption. On this basis, those courts ruled that the MDA did not pre-
empt the state tort claims in question.
E. FDA Interpretation
The FDA has also interpreted the meaning of section 360k(a) of the
MDA,226 stating:
Section 521 (a) of the act contains special provisions governing
the regulation of devices by States and localities. That section pre-
scribes a general rule that... no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish or continue in effect any requirement with respect
to a medical device intended for human use having the force and ef-
fect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or
court decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any re-
quirement applicable to such device under any provision of the act
and which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
227the act.
The FDA interpretation continues:
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food
and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regula-
tions or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particu-
lar device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State
or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in
224. Id. at 436-38 (noting that the existence of some federal requirements
did not necessarily mean all claims were preempted).
225. Id. at 438. The court noted that the defendant had not cited, and the
court was unable to find, any specific FDA regulations that were applicable to the
design of the device in question. Id. at 437.
226. See Exemptions From Federal Preemption of State & Local Medical
Device Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 808 (1996). This chapter is a means by which
certain regulations can be exempted from the preemption of section 360k(a). See
id. § 808.1(a). Interestingly, FDA regulations state that Minnesota Statutes sec-
tions 145.43 and 145.44 were denied an exemption by the FDA and are, there-
fore, preempted by section 521 (a) of the MDA. See id. § 808.73.
227. Id. § 808.1(b).
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addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration require-
228
ments.
The FDA's interpretation goes on to describe other state and local
requirements that affect medical devices, but that are not preempted by
section 360k(a) .2u It states, in pertinent part:
Section 521 (a) does not preempt State or local requirements of
general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates ei-
ther to other products in addition to devices... or to unfair trade
practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices.
... Generally, section 521 (a) does not preempt a State or local
requirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or mis-
branded devices. Where, however, such a prohibition has the effect of
establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device, e.g., a spe-
cific labeling requirement, then the prohibition will be preempted if
the requirement is different from, or in addition to, a Federal re-
230quirement established under the act.
Courts have interpreted this language in different manners.231
F. Conclusion
There had been considerable disagreement among the various fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals with respect to whether there are any pre-
emptive effects resulting from the MDA, specifically sections 360k(a) and
510(k).232 Courts were allowing express warranty claims to survive in cases
involving Class III PMA devices 3- and were split on the extent of preemp-
tion with respect to Class III substantially equivalent devices. Although
not detailed here, federal district courts were in as much conflict on the
issue of preemption of state-law claims by section 360k(a) of the MDA as
the federal circuit courts. 35 Even the FDA's interpretation of the provi-
228. Id. § 808.1(d).
229. Id. § 808.1(d)(1)-(9).
230. Id. § 808.1(d) (1), (d) (6) (ii).
231. See supra Parts IV.A-C (discussing several cases in which this language is
interpreted).
232. See supra Part IV.A-D (discussing relevant cases); see also 21 U.S.C. §§
360k(a), 510(k) (1994).
233. See supra Part 1V.B (discussing cases in which devices were marketed
after PMA approval).
234. See supra Part IV.D (discussing cases in which devices were marketed
under section 510 (k) notification).
235. See, e.g., Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that an express preemption provision contained in the Federal
Boat Safety Act preempts common-law actions in addition to positive state enact-
ments); Blanchard v. Collagen Corp., 909 F. Supp. 427, 437 (E.D. La. 1995) (con-
cluding that state common-law claims are preempted by section 360k(a) of the
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sion in question had been cited for different propositions. 2  The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Medtronic v. Lohr to resolve the con-
flict.
27
V. THE MEDTRONIC DECISION
In Medtronic v. Lohr, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the doctrine of federal preemption bars a state tort suit against
the manufacturer of a medical device that was sold under the regulatory
guise of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA). 2 3 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in this case to reconcile a disagreement
among the federal courts of appeals over the extent to which the MDA
preempts state common-law claims. In doing so, the Supreme Court
MDA); Ouellette v. Union Tank Car Co., 902 F. Supp. 5, 9-11 (D. Mass. 1995)
(holding that the Federal Railroad Safety Act preempts state common-law claims);
Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., No. 93-47-JD, 1995 WL 688959, at *5
(D.N.H. 1995) (holding that the Flammable Fabrics Act's preemption provision
preempts state common-law claims), rev'd, 96 F.3d 552 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997); see also Goldsmith v. Mentor Corp., 913 F. Supp. 56, 60-63
(D.N.H. 1995) (holding that the MDA preempts the plaintiffs common-law
claims); McQuerry v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 366, 370-71 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (concluding that the MDA does not create a private right of action and that
it does not completely preempt state law); Dow v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 899 F.
Supp. 822, 831 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that a state-law suit involving a Class II
device is preempted by section 360k(a) of the MDA); Richman v. W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 895, 901-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that state com-
mon-law claims such as negligent, careless, and reckless manufacture, design, con-
struction, labeling, packaging, distribution, and sale of a product were preempted
by section 360k(a) of the MDA); Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 47 (D.
Mass. 1994) (holding that there is no "fraud on the FDA" exception to section
360k(a)'s preemption; in other words, one may not sue in state court based on
the notion that the manufacturer did not follow FDA regulations); Bingham v.
Terminix Int'l Co., 850 F. Supp. 516, 522 (D. Miss. 1994) (concluding that the
Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act's preemption provision pre-
empts failure to warn and insufficient warning claims, but not claims for inade-
quate testing, strict liability, and breach of implied warranties).
236. See supra Part IV.E.
237. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
238. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k (1994). Section 360k states, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to
any device intended for human use any requirement -
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applica-
ble under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
239. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250; see also supra Part IV.A-D (discussing
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squared MDA preemption of state-law claims with the policy rationale un-
derlying the MDA, by preventing manufacturers from introducing un-
tested medical devices while being shielded from tort suits.2"
A. Factual Background
The Medtronic case involved a malfunctioning cardiac pacemaker.241
Medtronic designed and manufactured various models of "pacemaker
leads." These "leads" are the wires that extend out of the pacemaker and
come into direct physical contact with the heart. The leads transfer the
pacemaker's electric signal to the heart muscle, stimulating it so that it
beats at a regularized rate. 42 Model 4011 pacemaker leads were used in
the pacemaker implanted in the plaintiff Lora Lohr.24 ' The Lohrs alleged
that three years later after the pacemaker was implanted, it failed, result-
ing in a "complete heart block" requiring emergency surgery.2 The
Lohrs' physician attributed the failure of the pacemaker to the pacemaker
leads.2 "
B. Procedural Background
The Lohrs filed an action in Florida state court under the theories of
negligence and strict liability.2" Medtronic successfully moved to have the
case removed to federal district court where it filed a motion for summary
judgment.247 In its motion, Medtronic argued that the Lohrs' claims were
barred by the express preemption provision of the MDA.2 4 The district
court denied the motion.49
the lack of uniformity among federal circuit courts of appeals).
240. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2245 (stating, in the first words of the opin-
ion, that "Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, in the
words of the statute's preamble, 'to provide for the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices intended for human use'").





246. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248. The negligence claim included an alleged
breach of the
'duty to use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly and
sale of the subject pacemaker' in several respects, including the use of
defective materials in the lead and a failure to warn .... The strict liabil-
ity count alleged that the device was in defective condition and unrea-
sonably dangerous to foreseeable users at the time of its sale.
Id. The Lohrs' complaint also included a third count alleging breach of warranty;
the count was dismissed by the Florida state court for failure to state a claim. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2249.
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Soon after the Medtronic district court decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Duncan v. Iolab.5° In
Duncan, the court held that the preemption provision of the MDA re-
quired preemption of some common-law claims brought against a medical
device manufacturer.25' In light of the Duncan decision, the district court
reversed its earlier decision and dismissed the Lohrs' complaint in its en-
tirety.
252 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, hold-
ing that the Lohrs' negligent design claims were not preempted by the
MDA25 but that the negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims
were preempted by certain FDA regulations. 254 Finally, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that the Lohrs' strict liability claims were not preempted with re-
spect to their unreasonably dangerous design claims, but that preemption
did prevent the Lohrs from going forward with their negligent manufac-
turing and failure to warn claims. 55 The Supreme Court granted Med-
tronic's petition for certiorari onJanuary 19, 1996.56
C. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court considered three central issues in Medtronic.
257
The threshold issue was whether all tort claims were preempted by the
MDA.2 58 Medtronic argued that the entire complaint should be dismissed
on this basis.259 Second, the Supreme Court considered the Lohrs' claims
individually, analyzing whether section 360k(a) preempted the individual
state tort claims brought by the Lohrs.2 ° The individual claims included a
defective design claim, an identity of requirements claim, a manufacturing
claim, and a labeling claim.2 6' Finally, the Court considered whether the
250. 12 F.3d 194 (l1th Cir. 1994).
251. Id. at 195.
252. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2249.
253. Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting
that common-law actions are requirements imposed by the state for purposes of
the MDA's preemption provision, that preemption could not be avoided by claim-
ing that the negligence in question flowed from a violation of federal standards,
that the term "requirements" in the MDA's preemption provision was unclear,
and that in view of the FDA regulations with respect to the meaning of "require-
ments," the specific device in question would have to be regulated to fit the defi-
nition).
254. Id. at 1344-45; see also Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2249 (noting that the
court of appeals based its decision on the FDA's general "good manufacturing
practices" and labeling regulations).
255. Medtronic, 56 F.3d at 1351-52.
256. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
257. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2240-55.
258. Id. at 2245.
259. Id. at 2251.
260. Id. at 2254.
261. Id. at 2254-56.
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presence of a damages remedy amounted to an additional or different re-
quirement for purposes of section 360k(a) preemption.262
1. Preemption of the Negligent Design Claim
Medtronic argued the Lohrs' negligent design claim was preempted
by section 360k(a) .263 Medtronic argued that any common-law action would
constitute a "requirement" that would, in effect, be "different from, or in
addition to" the general federal standards found in the MDA and, there-
fore, would be preempted.2 ' The Court disagreed with Medtronic, con-
cluding that such a reading of the statute would be implausible.265 In its
analysis, the Court noted that the MDA does not give an express private
right of action for violation of its regulations and that an implied private
right of action had not even been suggested. 26  Based on these observa-
tions, the Court noted that if Medtronic were correct and all common-law
claims were preempted by the MDA, private plaintiffs would have no re-
267course against manufacturers of devices falling under this statute.
Such a result contradicts the first policy underlying the MDA - to
protect the public from harm by ensuring the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices. 26' The court noted that to allow a product to be mar-
keted and sold without any safety assurances, while holding that individu-
als harmed by such products have no recourse, would contradict this pol-
icy.265 The Court explicitly stated that Congress's purpose in enacting the
MDA was to provide more stringent regulation of these devices and their
manufacturers rather than freeing them entirely from potential liability.
76
Looking to the language of the statute, the Court concluded that "it would
take language much plainer than the text of [section] 360k to convince us
that Congress intended that result."271 Examining section 360k(a)'s lan-
guage, the Court noted that the preemption provision in question uses
the word "requirement."27 2 The Court observed that Congress easily could
have used the word "remedy" instead of "requirement" and that such lan-
guage would have clearly made the preemption provision of the MDA ap-
273plicable to state common-law claims.
262. Id. at 2255.





268. Id. at 2245.
269. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2251.
270. Id. at 2245.
271. Id. The result implies a scenario in which no recourse exists for parties
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The Court then distinguished this case from Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.* in which the Supreme Court held that a statute preempting state
"requirements" could also preempt common-law damages claims.7 Ini-
tially, the Court posited that the preemption statute in Cipollone did not
have ramifications as broad as those advocated for the MDA by Med-
tronic.276 The Court explained that the preemption in Cipollone was quite
narrow and that giving the result in that case its widest possible interpreta-
277tion would result in preemption under only limited circumstances. The
Court's analysis relied heavily on the fact that under Cipollone, it was still
possible to bring some common-law claims, thereby insuring that indi-
viduals have some legal recourse available.278 In contrast, Medtronic's po-
sition would preclude all such claims and leave plaintiffs without legal re-
279dress. In addition, the Court looked at the issue from a federalism
viewpoint and held that to adopt Medtronic's position would be a "serious
intrusion into state sovereignty. "28 The Court held that to give such effect
to language as ambiguous as that in the preemption provision of the MDA
would be unacceptable. 1
Continuing its attack on the position advocated by Medtronic, the
282Court distinguished the two statutes in question. The Court compared
the language of section 360k to the language of the preemptive statute at
issue in Cipollone, and it concluded that Congress was concerned with
"specific, conflicting State statutes and regulations rather than the general
duties enforced by common [-] law actions" when it enacted section 360k.282
In support of its decision to reject Medtronic's position, the Court di-
284rected its attention to the basic purpose of section 360k. The Court ex-
plained that the legislative history of the MDA reflected a desire to curb
federal and state regulatory burdens, not preexisting common-law du-
274. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
275. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252.
276. Id.
277. Id. (noting that Cipollone would result in preemption of state common-
law damages claims only when the requirements are based on health and smoking
and, of those actions, only those that involve the promotion or advertising of ciga-
rettes that are labeled in conformity with the provisions of the federal statute in
question).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2251.
280. Id. at 2252.
281. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252.
282. Id.
283. Id. (noting that section 360k refers to "requirements" frequently and
consistently throughout its text, that this word is linked with language suggesting
that Congress intended preemption of specific positive law, and that within the
act itself, the FDA is given authority to exempt "requirements" from preemption
and while having made exemptions has never done so with respect to any com-
mon-law duty).
284. Id. at 2252-53.
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ties.8 5 Further, the Court noted that any concern that Congress had for
protecting the medical device manufacturing industry was reflected in the
enactment of fewer substantive provisions within the Act itself and not by
means of section 360k(a) 286 The Court also stated that the "primary issue
motivating the MDA's enactment" was the safety of consumers using the
products that are covered by the MDA.2 7 In other words, the Court de-
cided that Medtronic's interpretation of the MDA undercut the policy
underlying the Act - to protect the public from harm by ensuring the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices.""
Finally, the Court relied upon legislative history to support the con-
clusion that section 360k(a) was not intended to preempt most, and cer-
tainly not all, suits brought under general common-law theories.2 8 9 The
Court concluded that due to the lack of language indicating such a result,
combined with the somewhat imprecise language of section 360k(a), "at
least some common [-] law claims against medical device manufacturers
may be maintained after the enactment of the MDA."86
An important policy consideration underlies this portion of the
Court's decision. The underlying policy of the MDA is to protect the pub-
lic from harm by ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical de-
vices. 9' In this case, the device in question had never been tested by the
FDA for safety and effectiveness because it was marketed under the "sub-
292stantial equivalence" exception to premarket approval. Because this de-
vice had not been proven safe or effective, the only safety-related con-
straint upon the manufacturer was the threat of a tort suit.293 If that piece
of the regulatory puzzle is removed, then nothing remains to protect the
public from harm and, at that point, the MDA's purpose is undermined. 4
285. Id. at 2253 (citing 122 CONG. REc. 5850 (Mar. 9, 1976)).
286. Id.
287. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253. Interestingly, the Court did not cite to
any MDA provision, any legislative history, or anything else to support this propo-
sition.
288. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
289. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 (noting that there is no language in the
hearings, the committee reports, or the debates suggesting that the legislation in
question should have the broad sweeping preemptive effect advocated by Med-
tronic).
290. See id. (noting the absence of language to support Medtronic's position
not only in the Act and its legislative history, but also in a number of reviews of
the legislation by other authors).
291. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
292. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2254; see also supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the
"substantial equivalence" exception).
293. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
294. Id. at 2251 (explaining that "Medtronic's construction of § 360k would
therefore have the perverse effect of granting complete immunity from design
defect liability to an entire industry").
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2. Individual State Tort Claims
Next, Medtronic argued that even if all common-law claims were not
preempted by section 360k(a), the Lohrs' claims in this case were pre-
empted individually. 95 In analyzing this argument, the Court addressed
the Lohrs' claims individually to determine whether they imposed any re-
quirements different from or additional to any already in place. 29' Each of
these claims is discussed in turn.
a. Premarket Approval and the Defective Design Claim
First, Medtronic argued that a suit under a state common-law theory
of defective design is preempted by the FDA's determination that the
pacemaker leads in question are "substantially equivalent" to pacemaker
leads sold previously.2 97 Substantial equivalence, or section 510(k) ap-
proval, is a determination made by the FDA pursuant to the MDA and al-
lows medical device manufacturers to market their products without prov-
ing the safety and effectiveness of the device through the PMA process"
Medtronic argued that a state common-law suit alleging defective de-
sign would be preempted by the FDA's determination that the pacemaker
leads were "substantially equivalent" under section 510(k) and that such a
determination amounts to a specific and federally enforceable design re-
quirement.2 99 The Court, however, rejected this argument on the basis
that the section 510(k) process is not aimed at a determination of safety
and effectiveness, but rather is aimed at "substantial equivalence," thereby
providing little protection to the public with respect to the safety and ef-
fectiveness of the product 0° In support of this position, the Court noted
that the letter from the FDA to Medtronic contained a disclaimer specifi-
cally precluding Medtronic from representing to the public that the FDA
approved of the safety or effectiveness of their pacemaker leads.01
The Court adopted the position that due to the nature of the section
510(k) process, the FDA had not issued any "requirements" with respect
to the pacemaker leads at issue and, therefore, section 360k was not in-
voked. 32 An opposite holding would allow manufacturers to be absolved
295. Id. at 2253-54.
296. Id. at 2254-58.
297. Id. at 2254-55.
298. See supra Part III.C.2.
299. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
300. Id. The court was relying upon a policy underpinning the MDA - the
protection of consumers through establishing the safety and effectiveness of
medical devices that will be used by the public. See id. at 2245.
301. Id. at 2254.
302. Id. This decision was based on the idea that section 510(k) approval
does not constitute a determination of safety or effectiveness. The Court pointed
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from any tort liability under circumstances in which they are faced with no
other source of liability. Such a result would fly in the face of the MDA's
policy.
303
b. Identity of Requirement Claims
The Lohrs argued that even if the premarket notification process
imposed "requirements" with respect to the manufacturing and labeling
of the pacemaker and even if state-law claims imposed a "requirement"
under the MDA, the state "requirement" would not be preempted unless
it were "different from, or in addition to" the federal requirement. 30 4 Spe-
cifically, the Lohrs argued that they could sue in state court based on
Medtronic's violation of FDA regulations.0 5 The Court held that state re-
quirements that are parallel to, or narrower than, the FDA regulations are
not "different from, or in addition to" the federal requirements within the
meaning of the statute and, therefore are not preempted.0 0
Again, the Court distinguished this case from Cipollone on the basis of
statutory differences.0 7 Specifically, the Court found that the statute con-
sidered in Cipollone had a preemptive effect, whereas the structure of the
MDA requires the FDA to promulgate a "requirement" in order to pre-
empt specific state laws.3°" The Court also noted that because the FDA is
given the authority to implement the provisions of the MDA in this fash-
ion, it is "uniquely qualified" to determine what, if anything, should be
preempted by the MDA. °9 Further, the Court noted that the regulations
promulgated by the FDA supported the Lohrs' arguments, in that no
common-law claims had been declared to be preempted. °
c. Manufacturing and Labeling Claims
The Lohrs also argued that Medtronic's preemption defense should
be rejected outright with respect to their manufacturing and labeling
out that the FDA included a disclaimer with the letter approving marketing of the
pacemaker leads, stating that the FDA did not approve of the safety or effective-
ness of the device. Further, the Court pointed out that section 510(k) was in-
tended to maintain the status quo with respect to devices on the market before
the MDA was enacted and their substantial equivalents. This status quo included
the possibility of defending a tort suit. Id. at 2255.
303. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.




308. Id. (explaining that "[u]nlike the statute construed in Cipollone, for in-
stance, preemption under the MDA does not arise directly as a result of the en-
actment of the statute").
309. Id.
310. Medtronic, 116S. Ct. at 2256.
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claims.3 ' As explained earlier, certain regulations apply to both the
manufacturing and labeling of medical devices."' These regulations are
enforceable by the FDA and require such devices to be labeled with in-
formation on use of the product, relevant hazards, side effects, and pre-
cautions. 13 Similarly, manufacturers must comply with "Good Manufactur-
ing Practices," or GMPs.314 These requirements apply to Class I, Class II,
and Class III devices whether they have been approved through the PMA• • 31-5
process or one of its exceptions.
The Lohrs argued that section 360k(a) mandates preemption only
where there is a conflict between a specific state regulation and a federal
316regulation specifically applicable to the same device. The Lohrs posited
that the general nature of the manufacturing and labeling regulations
precludes those regulations from meeting the standard of specific appli-
device. 317 On this basis, the Lohrs argued that sectioncability to a given  . ti s   sage7ta to
360k(a) preemption was not invoked and their claim was not pre-
empted!"
The Court agreed with the Lohrs on this issue, citing FDA regula-
tions and exemptions to section 360k(a) preemption granted by the FDA
to support this conclusion." The Court noted that none of the existing
exemptions was applicable to a state law of general applicability, only to
"excruciatingly specific" state requirements.2 0 Further, neither the exist-
ing requirements as described above, nor the state common-law claims as-
serted by the Lohrs, were specific enough or directed at a specific device
and, therefore, section 360k(a) preemption was not invoked. 1
d. Common-Law Duties Can Never Be "Requirements"
Finally, the Lohrs argued that common-law duties can never be "re-
quirements" for purposes of section 360k(a) and, therefore, this statute
can never preempt common-law actions. The Court specifically declined
to address this issue for two reasons.32 3 First, the issue was merely hypo-
thetical in this case, because the Court already had found that none of the
311. Id.
312. See supra Part III.A.
313. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
314. Id.
315. See supra Part III.A.
316. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2256.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 2257.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 2258.
322. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2258.
323. Id. at 2259.
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Lohrs' claims was preempted . Second, in view of the decision's empha-
sis on device specificity, very few, if any, common-law duties could be pre-
empted by section 360k(a).2 5 In the Court's analysis, such a determina-
tion would have to be made on the facts of the case and the interpretation
of the statute given by the Court.
3 2 6
e. Concurrences and Dissents
Given the lack of uniformity at the appellate level on this issue, it is
not surprising that the United States Supreme Court was not unanimous
in the Medtronic decision. In fact, the court was distinctly split on central
issues. Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion.2 7 Justices O'Connor,
Brennan, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.328
The dissent focused on the manner in which the majority opinion distin-
guished this case from Cipollone.'" The dissent did not agree that the two
statutes were distinguishable, and thus argued that the outcome in both
cases should be the same. 3 ° In other words, the dissenting Justices felt
that the Lohrs' claims should be preempted. The dissent also was critical
of the majority's deference to FDA regulations, noting, "Where the lan-
guage of the statute is clear, resort to the agency's interpretation is im-
proper.""3 ' The dissent then argued that the language of section 360k
clearly required preemption in this case.332 Finally, the dissent concluded
that a section 360k(a) "requirement" does include state common-law
claims.
33
D. Analysis of the Medtronic Decision
The Medtronic decision was a policy-based decision. The MDA has
two major policies underlying its existence: to promote the development
of new medical devices and to protect consumers by ensuring the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices. 33' The Supreme Court relied heavily
on the second policy rationale.
324. Id.
325. Id. (stating that "[iut will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common
law cause of action to issue a decree that has 'the effect of establishing a substan-
tive requirement for a specific device'").
326. Id.
327. Id. at 2259-62 (Breyer, J., concurring).
328. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2262-64 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
329. Id. at 2262-63.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 2263.
332. Id. at 2263-64.
333. Id. at 2253.
334. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
335. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253.
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The Court easily could have found, as many other courts previously
had concluded, that there were requirements in place with respect to
Class III devices approved for marketing through section 510(k). GMPs
and labeling requirements are two examples of regulations applicable to
Class III section 510(k) devices that other courts have found to constitute
"requirements" for purposes of section 360k(a). 3 6 Instead, the Court re-
lied heavily upon the fact that if state tort actions are preempted with re-
spect to section 510(k) devices, consumers who are injured by those de-
vices will have no legal recourse against the manufacturers.
s37
VI. IMPLICATIONS
To determine the implications of Medtronic, it is vital to discuss cases
that have interpreted the Medtronic decision. By analyzing those cases, the
future implications of the Medtronic decision for medical device manufac-
turers become more clear.
A. Cases Decided Post-Medtronic
Since the Court rendered Medtronic, several federal courts of appeals
have had the opportunity to interpret the decision. Each case is discussed
below with two goals in mind. The first goal is to explain the holding of
the court and the court's interpretation of the Medtronic decision. The
second goal is to address whether the court's interpretation is correct in
light of Medtronic.
Three groups of cases are discussed. First, this Note discusses cases
in which the devices were marketed pursuant to section 510(k) approval.
Second, cases involving a device tested pursuant to the IDE exception
from premarket approval will be discussed. Finally, this Note examines
cases in which Medtronic was used as the basis for a decision but in which
neither of the above types of medical devices was involved.
1. Cases Considering Devices Marketed Under Section 510(k)
In Reeves v. Acromed Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the MDA did not preempt the plaintiffs unreasonably dangerous per se
claim under state law.33' The court cited Medtronic for the proposition that
section 510(k) notification does not amount to a specific, federally en-
forceable design requirement and, therefore, does not preempt state tort
claims.339 The Fifth Circuit also noted that Medtronic holds that plaintiffs
336. See id.
337. See id. at 2257.
338. 103 F.3d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1997).
339. Id. at 446. As the Fifth Circuit noted, Medtronic stressed section 510(k)
provides little protection to the public because the section 510(k) process focuses
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may sue under state rules that duplicate the FDA regulations without in-
volving section 360k(a) preemption, because such rules are not different
from or additional to any regulations.'"
In Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals interpreted Medtronic to mean that state common-law causes of ac-
tion may constitute requirements for purposes of the MDA.34' The court,
however, indicated that such requirements would be preempted only if
they conflict with a specific regulation promulgated by the FDA applicable
to the particular device at hand, or with some other device-specific re-
quirement imposed by the MDA.342 The court concluded, "[S]tate-law
claims pertaining to medical devices subject only to the general controls
imposed by the section 510(k) notification process, GMPs, or labeling re-
quirements are not preempted."3 43 Interestingly, the Duvall court ex-
tended the holding of Medtronic to include claims for breach of implied
warranty.344
In both Reeves and Duvall, the respective courts held that the substan-
tial equivalence, or section 510(k), approval process does not create the
type of device-specific regulations required to invoke preemption under
section 360k(a).3 Both courts cited the Medtronic decision for that propo-
on equivalence rather than safety and effectiveness. Furthermore, according to
the Medtronic court, the statute and legislative history suggested this process was
intended to maintain the status quo, including defending state tort suits. See id.
340. Id. at 446-48. The Reeves court noted that the Medtronic Court held that
rules which merely duplicate the FDA's rules may be narrower without being "dif-
ferent." Further, the presence of a damages remedy was held not to constitute a
different or additional requirement, but merely provided another reason for
medical device manufacturers to comply with the federal law. See id. Reeves also
noted that this decision was in accord with two pre-Medtronic decisions. Id. (citing
Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989)).
341. 103 F.3d 324, 329 (4th Cir. 1996).
342. Id. at 330.
343. Id. On the basis of this interpretation of Medtronic, the Duvall court
held that the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by section 360k(a). Id. The
court stated, "[Section] 360k(a) of the MDA preempts state-law causes of action to
the extent that, if successful, they would impose requirements different from or
additional to requirements specifically applicable to the particular device under
the MDA." Id. at 332. "The state-law claims ... in this action, if successful, surely
would impose requirements .... They are not preempted, however, because
there are no specific federal requirements applicable to the prosthesis." Id.
344. Id. at 330 n.5. The court stated, "Although the Court did not address a
claim for breach of implied warranty in Medtronic, we nevertheless determine that
the reasoning of that decision requires a conclusion that state-law claims for
breach of implied warranties are not preempted by [section] 360k(a)." Id. The
court then noted that Medtronic cited an FDA regulation which lists the UCC war-
ranty of fitness as an example of the type of state regulation which the MDA does
not preempt. Id.
345. Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103 F.3d 442, 445-47 (5th Cir. 1997); Duvall,
103 F.3d at 329.
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sition and, on that basis, concluded that state tort remedies would not be
preempted with respect to a section 510(k) device. This is clearly a cor-
rect interpretation of the Medtronic decision, in that the key holding of the
decision is that state tort theories are not preempted by section 360k(a)
with respect to devices that are approved for marketing under section
510(k).4' Both of these decisions correctly apply and adhere to Medtronic.
2. Cases Considering Devices Being Tested Pursuant to the
Investigational Device Exemption
Martin v. Teletronics Pacing Systems, Inc. distinguished between cases
involving devices approved for marketing by showing the devices were
substantially equivalent to preexisting devices, and those marketed under
the IDE exception to the PMA process.m8 In Martin, the device at issue was
approved for use under the IDE exemption to the PMA process. 49 In Mar-
tin, the court analogized the process of receiving approval for an IDE de-
vice to the PMA process. 350 The court noted that like the PMA process, the
IDE process subjects the device in question to a set of complex and com-
prehensive regulations, setting forth detailed procedures for determining
whether it is safe and effective.351 On the basis of the difference between
the IDE and section 510(k) processes, the court held that the Medtronic
analysis does not apply to IDE devices. 35 2 Under the regulations applicable
to IDE devices, the court found the plaintiffs' claims were preempted.'53
In Sanders v. Optical Radiation Corp., the plaintiff brought an action
354against the manufacturer of an IDE device alleging negligence per se.
The Fourth Circuit held that under Medtronic the negligence per se claim
346. Reeves, 103 F.3d at 445; Duvall, 103 F.3d at 329.
347. See supra Part V.C-D (discussing the Medtronic decision).
348. 105 F.3d 1090, 1095-96 (6th Cir. 1997).
349. Id. at 1097-98. The Martin plaintiffs argued that the pacemaker was
approved under the section 510(k) process rather than under the IDE exception
to the PMA process. The pacemaker contained a combination of parts, some of
which had been approved through the section 510(k) process and others through
the IDE process. The court treated the device as a whole and classified the device
as an IDE device. Id. at 1098.
350. Id. at 1095.
351. Id. The court cited several sources for the proposition that IDE devices
are subject to a determination of safety and effectiveness. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §
360j (g) (3) (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.20, .25, .27 (1996)).
352. Id. at 1097.
353. Id. at 1098-1101. The court addressed the plaintiffs' manufacturing
defect, design defect, inadequate warning, and nonconformance to express rep-
resentations claims, as well as their claim that the supplier was individually liable.
Id.
354. No. 95-1967, 1996 WL 423124, at *1 (4th Cir. July 30, 1996). The
plaintiff also pursued state-law claims under the tort theories of strict liability, neg-
ligence, lack of informed consent, and breach of warranty. Id. at *2.
[Vol. 23
46
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol23/iss4/3
MEDTRONIC, INC. v. LOHR
was not preempted.55 The court based its conclusion on the fact that a
negligence per se action merely incorporates the FDA's standards and,
therefore, it cannot involve a requirement that is "different from, or in
addition to" those standards. 6 The court remanded the plaintiffs other
claims to the district court for a careful determination of whether each al-
leged something other than noncompliance with federal standards . 7
In Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that a claim of
negligence with respect to an IDE device can survive MDA preemption
under Medtronic!"" The court held that such a suit would not add any re-
quirements different from or additional to those required by the MDA,
because the nucleus of the claim was that the FDA's required procedures
were not followed.5 9 The court did, however, find that claims of strict li-
ability and breach of implied warranty of merchantability were preempted
under Medtronic, because they imposed greater requirements on the de-
vice manufacturer than did the FDA regulations.m
The decisions in these three cases are not in harmony. In both Sand-
ers and Chambers, the respective courts held that tort theories relying upon
the FDA regulations are not preempted by section 360k(a). 1 However, in
Martin, the court held that the IDE process itself is analogous to the PMA
process and, therefore, all tort theories are preempted by section
360k(a) . Under Medtronic, a court analyzing preemption should ask two
questions: (1) whether there are specific regulations in place with respect
to the medical device, and (2) if so, whether the claims being asserted are
different from or additional to those requirements. The answers to
those questions are not provided by the Medtronic decision for any devices
other than section 510(k) devices.
355. Id. at *2.
356. Id. at*1.
357. Id. at *2 (stating that Medtronic "suggests a case-specific assessment of
the claims and of any applicable federal requirements").
358. No. 96-1742, 1997 WL 155113, at *6-*7 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 1997).
359. Id. at *6. The court held that a suit seeking damages for noncompli-
ance with FDA regulations does not impose requirements different from or in ad-
dition to those imposed by the FDA. Id.
360. Id. at *4. The court found that under either strict liability or breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, the manufacturer could be found liable
while meeting the FDA regulations and that this constituted the imposition of an
impermissibly different requirement. Id.
361. Id. at *6-*7; Sanders v. Optical Radiation Corp., No. 95-1967, 1996 WL
423124, at *3-*4 (9th Cir. July 30, 1996).
362. Martin v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (6th Cir.
1997).
363. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2254-56 (1996); see also supra
Part V.C-D (discussing the Medtronic decision).
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3. Cases Applying Medtronic in Other Contexts
In Papike v. Tambrands Inc., the Ninth Circuit cited Medtronic for the
proposition that a specific FDA requirement applicable to a particular de-
vice triggers MDA preemption.'6 In this case, the court found that spe-
cific regulations for labeling the product existed.365 The plaintiff argued
that general duties owed to consumers were not preempted because the
tort theories were not specifically developed with respect to the device in
question.36 Comparing the state tort theory in question to the FDA's la-
beling requirements, the court determined that allowing the tort theory to
go forward would impose a requirement different from the FDA require-
ments. 367 Therefore, the court held that section 360k(a) preempted the
plaintiff's claim.3 6
In Committee of Dental Amalgam Manufacturers & Distributors v. Stratton,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the MDA preempted the California
Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65).69 The
court of appeals applied the reasoning from Medtronic, which held that a
state or local requirement is preempted by the MDA only if there are spe-
cific counterpart requirements or regulations in existence that are appli-
cable to a particular device.70 The court noted that Proposition 65 had
general applicability and was not enacted as a device-specific require-
ment.37 The court also noted that Proposition 65 imposed warning re-
quirements on all products and services that pose a public health risk.
37 2
On this basis, the Ninth Circuit held that the MDA did not preempt
Proposition 65.
In Papike and Stratton, the courts applied the Medtronic analysis to
situations not involving section 510(k) devices. 7 4 Under Medtronic, courts
conduct a two-part analysis: First, are there any device-specific regulations
in place with respect to the device in question, and second, are the theo-
364. 107 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 1997).
365. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1996) as the specific require-
ment for tampon labeling).
366. Id. at 741. The plaintiff argued that a state tort rule of general applica-
bility does not constitute a state requirement that is made "with respect to" a spe-
cific medical device. Id.
367. Id. at 742. The court noted that Medtronic does not preclude general
state requirements, such as state tort theories, from ever being preempted. Id.
368. Id.
369. 92 F.3d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Committee v.
Becker, 117 S. Ct. 754 (1997).
370. See id. at 812.
371. Id. at 813.
372. Id. The court stressed that California had not adopted any specific
regulations or requirements with respect to dental amalgam. Id.
373. Id. at 813-14.
374. Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 1997); Stratton,
92 F.3d at 807.
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ries being advanced additional to or different from those regulations? "-
This part of the Medtronic analysis likely will be used when analyzing any
claim of preemption under the MDA and is the proper analysis. However,
the Medtronic decision does not shed light on what the answers to either of
these questions should be with respect to any devices other than those ap-
proved for marketing under section 510(k).
B. Implications
Based upon Medtronic and subsequent cases interpreting it, the impli-
cations of Medtronic are clear in most respects. In this section, the general
implications for the analysis of MDA preemption issues under Medtronic
will be discussed. A discussion of the implications of the Medtronic deci-
sion in the context of PMA-approved devices, IDE-approved devices, and
section 510 (k)-approved devices will follow.
1. General Implications for the Analysis of MDA Preemption Issues
Under Medtronic, courts are to analyze whether section 360k(a) pre-
emption is invoked with respect to a medical device by answering two
questions. First, the court is to determine whether there are any specific
regulations in place with respect to the device in question. 76 Second, the
court is to look at the state tort theory being advanced and compare it to
the requirements applicable to that device.377 If the tort theory in ques-
tion does not pose requirements different from or additional to any re-
quirements already existing with respect to the device, then the claim will
not be preempted by section 360k(a)Y"8 On the other hand, if the tort
theory does impose requirements different from or additional to those
applicable to the device, the claims will be preempted by section
360k(a) .379
2. Implications for PMA-Approved Devices
The Medtronic decision did not specifically address devices approved
through the PMA process. As such, the decision does not shed any light
on what the correct answers are to the two questions used to analyze MDA
preemption issues with respect to devices approved for marketing through
the PMA process. However, under the analysis presented in Medtronic and
other cases, it is quite clear that the PMA process is sufficient to establish a
"requirement" with respect to such a device for section 360k(a) purposes.
375. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2254-56 (1996).
376. See id. at 2254.
377. See id. at 2254-56.
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In fact, these requirements are so detailed that it is unlikely that any state
tort claim would survive section 360k(a) preemption.
3. Implications for IDE-Approved Devices
The implications of Medtronic on the preemption of state tort claims
with respect to IDE-approved medical devices are unclear. It is clear that
the same two questions as explained above are to be asked in the analysis
of the preemption question when considering preemption of an IDE de-
vice. However, Medtronic gives no guidance as to what the correct answers
to those questions are with respect to these devices. As has been discussed
previously, this lack of guidance has led to inconsistent decisions, and it
could prompt Supreme Court consideration of the issue.
4. Implications for Section 510(k) Premarket Notification Devices
The Medtronic decision clearly answers the question of whether the
section 510(k) process creates requirements for purposes of section
360k(a) preemption: The answer is a resounding "no."31 Because there
are no regulations in place with respect to these devices, there is nothing
for state tort theories to be different from or additional to. This means
that manufacturers of section 510(k) devices will no longer be able to ar-
gue successfully that state tort claims are preempted by section 360k(a).
This conclusion is supported by the holdings in Reeves and Duval318
VII. CONCLUSION
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 granted the FDA authority
over medical device regulation. The MDA contains an express preemp-
tion provision preempting any state law that is "different from, or in addi-
tion to" any provision of the MDA. This provision was the subject of years
of inconsistent interpretations by the courts. Some of that ambiguity has
been resolved by the Supreme Court decision in Medtronic v. Lohr.
In Medtronic, the Court delineated a two-step approach to analyzing
preemption issues. First, are any device-specific requirements in place?
Second, if so, do the tort theories being asserted have requirements which
are "different from, or in addition to" those imposed under the MDA? If
tort theories do impose different or additional requirements on the medi-
cal device, then they are preempted.
Medtronic holds that the answer to the first question with respect to
devices approved for marketing under section 510(k) is "no." In other
words, the section 510(k) process does not impose requirements upon a
380. See id. at 2254.
381. See supra Part VI.A.1.
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device for purposes of preemption under the MDA. Therefore, there are
no requirements in place for state tort theories to be different from or
additional to, and preemption is not invoked when a device manufacturer
is being sued under tort theories for a device that was approved for mar-
keting under section 510(k) of the MDA. Post-Medtronic cases have cor-
rectly adhered to the principles outlined in Medtronic. Although Medtronic
clearly resolves the preemption issue with respect to section 510(k) pre-
market notification devices, a clear answer does not exist with respect to
preemption of claims involving PMA- and IDE-approved devices.
William Stute
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